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HOW Soviet and U.S. real national income compare is a question of
much interest in the West. The question began to be considered pri-
marily in the appraisal of Soviet military potential, and continues to
be of concern for this reason, though no longer as much so as at the
height of the Cold War. In a more academic context, comparison of
the outputs of the two countries has long been a means of putting the
Societ economy in perspective and so facilitating understanding of its
functioning. Such a comparison may also serve as a point of departure
for normative appraisal of the Soviet performance.
This essay presents some further calculations on this matter. I draw
heavily on, indeed have done little more than synthesize the results of,
research done by others. 1t may have been possible, however, to
improve on comparative data now available on national income in the
two countries.
Theory teaches that comparisons of real national income in different
countries, like such comparisons within a single country at different
times, may have to proceed somewhat differently depending on which
of two analytic purposes is in mind: appraisal of comparative "pro-
duction potential" or appraisal of comparative "welfare." I take as a
NOTE: Simon Kuznets kindly read a preliminary draft, and I have profited from
his comments on it.
As so often in the past, I am much indebted to Mary Towle for impeccable
typing.
This study and the Reply, below, were done with the aid of a grant from the
National Science Foundation (Contract G-1525).146 CurrentInternational Comparisons
desideratum here the appraisal of comparative production potential.
To what extent such an abstract desideratum can be achieved is
another matter, but the inquiry is usefully organized nevertheless with
it in mind.
Because of the dating of the basic data, I calculate national income
for both countries initially for 1955. Comparative magnitudes that are
derived for that year, however, may be extrapolated to more recent
years by use of published indexes of the change over time in physical
volume.
'While national income purportedly represents the sum of "final"
goods and services produced by a cmmunity, it almost inevitably
omits diverse activities which contribute to final output, and includes
others which at least in part might properly be considered intermediate
rather than final. This is a familiar theme, and need not be elaborated
here, but it should be observed that in 1955 the USSR was still much
behind the United States in terms of degree of industrialization,
though of course not nearly as far behind as in 1928, on the eve
of the five-year plans. Thus, in 1955, over two-fifths of the Soviet labor
force was still employed in agriculture. For the United States,
corresponding figure was 8.4 per cent.'
As generally understood, the degree to which national income omits
final activities, or includes intermediate ones, depends on the degree
of industrialization. On balance, output of a less industrialized coun-
try tends to be understated relative to that in a more industrialized
one.
That should be so here, but the two countries considered also differ
in their social systems. Curiously this probably has tended to limit
rather than compound the understatement of output in the USSR
relative to the United States. Thus, one of the most important
omissions from national income is home processing. Because of the
notably extensive employment of women in the USSR, however, the
volume of home processing there must be less than normal for a
country of a comparable degree of industrialization.2 Because of the
'See the references cited below.
2Inthe USSR in 1960 women accounted for more than half of all civilian em-
ployees, and for some 47 per cent of all civilian employees outside agriculture. In
the United States in the same year women accounted for 29 per cent of all civilianUSSR and U.S. Comparative National Income147
wholesalesocialization in the Soviet Union, many independent activ-
ities of a kind that might tend to escape reporting, and hence inclusion
in national income, have also been drastically curtailed, if not wholly
eliminated, there.
THE CALCULATIONS
Comparative data have been compiled on Soviet and U.S. national
income by final use, and also in a highly summary way on Soviet and
U.S. national income by industry of origin. The former data are the
more basic here, however, and for the present I focus on them. Follow-
ing the path blazed long ago by Gilbert and I have tried to
compile measures in terms of the prices of both countries. That is, I
take as a point of departure data for each country on its national in-
come by final use in terms of its own prices, and in each case derive
corresponding figures in terms of the prices of the other country.
In Tables 1 and 2 are shown the data on national income by use
with which I began, and the corresponding figures derived in terms of
prices of the other country. As indicated, in measuring national income
I focus particularly on gross national product.
In the tables, the final use categories are to be construed as the
designations would ordinarily imply, but it should be observed that for
the United States the figures on defense cover practically all of the
relevant outlays. For the USSR, however, the corresponding data refer
essentiaHy to the so-named category in the government budget. The
precise scope of this category is still controversial, but there are clearly
significant omissions. One omission is the support of quasi-military
internal security forces. In Tables 1 and 2, this is included, along with
internal security generally, under government administration. Much
defense-related research may fall under communal services rather than
defense, while atomic weapon development and stockpiling may at
least in part be omitted from defense and find its way instead into
employees. See Abram Bergson, "Comparative Productivity and Efficiency in the
USSR" (hereafter, Bergson, Productivity), in Alexander Eckstein, ed., Comparisons of
Economic Systems, Berkeley, Calif., 1971.
s Milton Gilbert and Irving B. Kravis, An International Comparison of National



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































o150 Current International Comparisons
gross investment. Under communal services, health care and education
for the United States include private as well as public outlays. The
private outlays are accordingly excluded from household consump-
tion. For the USSR, reference is only to public outlays, but these are
nearly comprehensive in that country.
These are perhaps the more interesting incongruities affecting our
final use categories, but there are others. The reader with special
interests, therefore, may wish to refer to the principal sources on
which I have drawn for data on national income by use in national
prices: for the USSR, RAND studies by me and by others associated
with me; and for the United States, publications of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce. These studies are cited in appendixes A and B.
These are the first two of a set of three mimeographed appendixes
that are available on request.4 I also explain there some revisions and
rearrangements of published data that seemed in order for present
purposes.
When output is calculated in ruble values I have compiled data in
terms not only of prevailing but adjusted prices. The latter are essen-
tially prevailing ruble prices after deduction of the famous turnover
tax and the addition of subsidies. I have explored at length in pre-
vious studies the problem posed for the valuation of Soviet national
income by the proverbial limitations of prevailing ruble prices.5
Suffice it to say that in approaching the problem I take as a point of
departure the factor cost standard of valuation that theory teaches is
appropriate, where production potential is the object of interest. The
calculation in adjusted prices is to be viewed in that light. In fact, even
adjusted rubles are rather remote from the factor cost standard of
theory, but they still seem preferable to prevailing rubles if produc-
tion potential is of concern, and are by no means lacking in merit, I
think, as a practical expedient.
Where output is calculated in dollar values, I have considered only
4 Of my RAND studies, the chief is The Real National Income of Soviet Russia
Since 1928 (hereafter, Real SNIP), Cambridge, Mass., 1961. The main Commerce
Department publication used is The National Income and Product Tables of the
United States, 1929—1965 (hereafter, National lncome—1966), Washington, D.C., 1966.
5 See Real SNIP, Chap. 3; Bergson, Productivity.USSR and U.S. Comparative National Income151
prevailingprices. A further computation in terms of dollar factor
cost would have been to the good, but the results probably would not
be very different from those where valuation is in prevailing prices.6
Even dollar factor cost, of course, is not the same thing as the factor-
cost of national income valuation theory. It no doubt does riot diverge
as much from the latter ideal, however, as do adjusted rubles.
For Soviet national income, I draw on earlier studies primarily for
data in prevailing rubles, but corresponding data in adjusted rubles
have also been compiled previously. I do little more here than revise
these figures to make them conform to the data used on national in-
come in terms of prevailing rubles. Moreover, once U.S. national in-
come is calculated in terms of prevailing rubles, corresponding data in
terms of adjusted rubles may be derived by applying to the prevailing
ruble values of outlays in different use categories appropriate co-
efficients obtained from the calculations of Soviet national income in
prevailing and adjusted rubles. I explain in appendixes A and B the
calculation of national income in adjusted rubles from data in pre-
vailing rubles for both the USSR and the United States.
As an element in national income in prevailing prices, farm income
in kind is valued throughout at average realized farm prices. Thus, for
each country farm income in kind is valued initially in terms of aver-
age realized farm prices in the country in question and then in terms
of average realized farm prices for the other country. In the calcula-
tions in adjusted rubles, average realized farm prices are adjusted for
taxes and subsidies along with prices generally.
Outlays in prevailing prices of one country are translated into out-
lays in prevailing prices of the other primarily by deflation, that is, by
application of ruble-dollar price ratios for different groups of goods
that were compiled from corresponding ratios for different commod-
ities. In the case of outlays on commodities I rely chiefly on ruble-
dollar price ratios that are either taken from or calculated from data
6 See Abram Bergson and Hans Meymann, Jr.,Soviet National income and
Product, 1940—1948, New York, 1954, p. 103,n.18; Morris Bornstein, "A Comparison
of Soviet and United States National Product," in Joint Economic Committee (here.
after, JEC), Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies, Part II, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, p. 880.152 CurrentInternational Comparisons
in unclassified reports of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,7 and in
a study by Abraham S. Becker for the RAND Corporation.8
In these studies, ruble-dollar parities have been compiled from
ruble price quotations obtained mainly from Soviet price handbooks
and observers' reports and corresponding U.S. price data compiled by
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. U.S. price data were also obtained
from the Sears, Roebuck catalogue and by special inquiry. For con-
struction, reference was made to Soviet cost estimates used in revalua-
tion of capital assets and to U.S. reported contract prices.
In translating farm income in kind, I refer to data on both physical
structure and average realized farm prices. Average realized farm prices
•for the USSR are Nancy Nimitz's as given in a RAND study and for
the United States are those reported in government publications.
In the foregoing ways I also obtain parities for translation of com-
modity components of outlays for final services, such as health care,
education, and government administration. Corresponding expendi-
tures for labor services are converted by reference to data from diverse
sources on employment and average earnings in the two countries.
Outlays for services of military personnel, including military sub-
sistence, are translated in the same way as expenditures for labor in
outlays for health care, education, government administration and the
like.
As is proper, I try throughout to use price ratios with Soviet weights
to deflate ruble outlays and ratios with U.S. weights to deflate dollar
outlays. Details on sources and methods used in translating outlays
from, one currency to the other may be found in appendixes A and B.
7"AComparison of Consumption in the USSR and US," ER 64-1, January 1964,
and "A Comparison of Consumption in the USSR and US (Supplement)," ER 64-1-s,
January 1964 (hereafter, Consumption); "1955 Ruble-Dollar Price Ratios for Inter-
mediate Products and Services in the USSR and US," June 1960 (hereafter, Inter-
mediate Products); and "1955 Ruble-Dollar Ratios for Construction in the USSR
and the US," ER 64.26, August 1964 (hereafter, Construction). I have satisfied my.
self that these reports are scholarly studies, and have utilized them as such. As will
appear, at important points the results would not have been greatly affected if
reference had been made instead to alternative sources that are sometimes available.
8"Pricesof Producers' Durables in the United States and the USSR in 1955"
(hereafter, Becker, Prices), RAND RM-2432, Santa Monica, Calif., August 15, 1959.USSR and U.S. Comparative National income153
APPRAISAL
Calculations of the sort that have been described are almost inevitably
crude. Those made here are no exception to that rule. Appraisal of
their reliability, however, may be facilitated if I now examine sum-
marily the more important sources of error, and consider whether a
bias is likely in one direction or the other. Of particular interest here
is the translation of outlays from one currency to another. I focus
especially, therefore, on the ruble-dollar price ratios for different
groups of goods used in the translation. Where one currency is trans-
lated into the other by use of physical volume indexes rather than by
deflation, reference is to the implied rather than explicit parities. It
should be borne in mind that where the error in such parities takes
the form of an overvaluation of the ruble, Soviet outlays in dollars
are overstated and U.S. outlays in rubles are understated. Under-
valuation of the ruble has a reverse effect.
Price Quotations
In each country the price of any commodity considered in the com-
pilation of parities ideally should represent the average unit value at
which the commodity is delivered to its final use. In fact, the price
quotations considered in compiling the parities used here are often
otherwise. Among other things, ruble retailprices often refer to
Moscow while dollar retail prices are often taken from a Sears, Roebuck
catalogue. Use of Moscow retail prices, however, probably does not lead
to any very consequential error.9 As for the Sears, Roebuck prices,
these were used for many nonfood items. In calculations of the kind
described here, such a use of Sears, Roebuck prices is often made, but
the validity of this procedure still remains to be tested systematically.b0
9Suchprices are used without correction primarily in the case of foods. According
to data assembled by Janet Chapman, however, Moscow prices for twelve major foods
averaged 101per cent of corresponding all-USSR average prices in1936. Also
Moscow and all-USSR average prices have moved closely together since that date.
See Janet Chapman, Real Wages in Soviet Russia Since 1928, Cambridge, Mass.,
l96&
10Inresponse to an inquiry regarding the representativeness of Sears prices, Dr.
Arthur M. Ross, then commissioner of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, com-
mented as follows ina letter of January 30,1967: "Unfortunately,itis not
possible to make a positive statement in this regard, nor have we made any definitive154 Current International Comparisons
Except for alcoholic beverages, the dollar retail prices considered omit
state and local sales taxes. The resulting undervaluation of the ruble
for all household consumption might be on the order of 1 or 2 per
cent."
For producers' durables, the values to be deflated in both countries
are inclusive of freight charges. That is customary in national income
calculations, and also proper, at least where the concern is to appraise
production potential.12 Ruble-dollar price ratios are compiled, how-
ever, from f.o.b. shipper prices. Moreover, transportation and distribu-
tion charges probably account for a larger share of delivered prices in
the United States than in the USSR. Hence, here too, the ruble is un-
dervalued, and perhaps appreciably. Thus, for gross investment as a
whole the adjusted ruble may be undervalued by as much as 5 per cent,
where Soviet weights are applied, and 3 per cent where U.S. weights
are applied. A similar undervaluation occurs in the defense ruble,
where the parity for producers' durables is taken as a surrogate for
that for munitions.13 A further error of uncertain nature is introduced
study of the subject. Sears' prices for various items are set according to various
marketing strategies, availability of resources, and a variety of other competitive
factors. As a result, prices for some items may be higher than average; others may be
lower. Sears' catalog prices are used on a limited basis in the Consumer Price Index,
particularly for the small cities (under 50,000 population) where mail.order buying
is still important. On the basis of our own observations, we would conclude that
Sears' prices are generally somewhat lower than are prices for nationally advertised
brands having comparable descriptions, but are about the same as private brands
offered by other stores.
"If the foregoing has not really answered your question, I would hasten to add
that we in the Bureau of Labor Statistics, as well as researchers in the academic
world and in private industry, have extensively used prices from the Sears' catalog
as a general indicator of retail price levels for many commodities, particularly in
making international comparisons."
11Forhousehold retail nonfood purchases, I use a Soviet-weighted parity of 17.4
rubles to the dollar and a U.S.-weighted parity of 18.4 rubles to the dollar. Adjusted
for state and local sales taxes omitted from dollar prices, these parities might have
fallen to, say, 16.8 and 17.7 rubles to the dollar, respectively. The omitted state and
local sales taxes, I believe, are those of a general sort, as distinct from excises on
tobacco and gasoline. On the possible magnitudes involved, see National Income—
1966, pp. 54—55. With indicatedreductions in ruble-dollar parities for household
retailnonfood purchases,the corresponding adjustedruble-dollarparitiesfor
household consumption would fall by 0.6 and 1.7 per cent. The parities for house-
hold nonfood purchases also figure somewhat in my calculations at other points.
12SeeBergson, Productivity.
13Onthe possible importance, for the parity for producers' durables, of the
omission of transportation and distribution charges, see Becker, Prices,pp. 16—17.USSR and U.S. Comparative National Income155
whereverU.S. price quotations were obtained only from selected
manufacturers.
As indicated, parities for construction are compiled from Soviet
cost elements rather than final prices. Since such estimates are based
on established input norms, which are often exceeded, the ruble must
be appreciably overvalued at this point.'4 Although average construc-
tion prices could not be compiled for either country, an attempt was
made to pair projects that were "similarly" located in the two coun-
tries.
Comparability of Commodities
In compiling ruble and dollar price quotations for different corn-
rnodities, studies on which I draw have sought to assure that relevant
economic features of commodities paired in the two countries are
comparable. This desideratum too, however, was often difficult to
realize. Resulting errors in the calculations must vary in different
cases, but we must consider that the production of defective or other-
wise substandard goods, while a feature in any modern economy, is
by all accounts notably pervasive in the USSR. For example, among
products examined in the first half of 1962 by inspectors of the
Ministry of Trade of the Russian Soviet Federated Soviet Republic,
32.7 per cent of clothing articles, 25 per cent of knitwear, and 32.6
per cent of leather shoes were rejected or reclassified to a lower quality
category. Among clothing and knitwear articles inspected by the
Ministry of Trade of the Ukraine during 1963, 20 to 25 per cent were
condemned as defective.15 In all these cases it is consumers' goods that
are in question, but production of substandard qualities is often re-
ported for producers' goods as well.
How does this affect comparability? So far as substandard goods are
in fact rejected or reclassified to a lower quality category, their pro-
duction need not affect comparability at all, but it would be surprising
if such goods were not often sold simply as standard goods. This might
be so in any case, but is more likely in the USSR where both consum-
14 Construction, pp. 9—10; A. I. Kats, Proizvoclitei'n.ost' trucla v SSSR i giavnykh
kapitatisticheskikh stranakh, Moscow, 1964, p. 56.
15 Abram Bergson, TheEconomicsof Soviet Planning, New Haven, Conn., 1964,
p. 295.156 CurrentInternational Comparisons
ers' and producers' goods have been chronically disposed of in a sell-
er's market.1° By implication, goods in the USSR that are nominally
comparable to those in the United States must often be inferior in
fact. At this point, therefore, the ruble-dollar price ratios should tend
to overvalue the ruble. The overvaluation, I believe, could be con-
sequential.
I have referred primarily to commodities, but what has been said
should also apply essentially to construction. Thus, here as elsewhere
an attempt was made to pair quotations for comparable projects, but
at least in the case of housing the end products of Soviet construction
work have been notoriously deficient in quality. This could be only
partly taken account of in pairing quotations. Hence, here too the
ruble should be overvalued.
Comparability of Services
While the parities used for construction, including housing, prob-
ably overvalue the ruble, differences in quality are allowed for in the
derivation of a parity for housing services. The allowance is arbitrary,
but the direction of any resultant error is conjectural.
On the other hand, for a variety of other final services, the calcula-
tions expressly or by implication take comparative wages as an appro-
priate parity for deflation of outlays for labor. Hence, labor inputs
are taken to be of the same quality in the two countries. This is, of
course, a conventional kind of assumption in national income account-
ing, but needless to say it may be materially in error. The calculations
in question here are a case in point, for the ruble, very possibly, is often
overvalued in respect of the labor component of final services. That
seems likely when we consider, for example, that the average level of
education of labor employed in final services must usually be less in
the USSR than in the United States. Also, relatively more women are
often employed in such services in the USSR than in the United
States, and one perhaps need not be an antifeminist to feel that
quality is sometimes inferior on that account as
16Thereare many signs, though, that at least for consumers' goods this is no
longer as true as it was in earlier years.
17In1960, according to computations of a Denison type, one Soviet worker was
comparable on the average to 0.97 of a high school graduate. The corresponding
figure for the U.S. worker was 1.17. See Bergson, Productivity. Soviet labor mustUSSR and U.S. Comparative National Income157
TABLE3
Labor Outlays in Selected Final Services,








Prevailing rubles 11.1 1.7
Adjusted rubles 13.2 2.2
Dollars 31.4 8.9
The servicesincluded arehealthcare, education, governmentadministration,and
defense (military personnel only).
At any rate, as was to be expected, the parities used to translate out-
lays for final labor services are far more favorable to the ruble than
are those used to translate expenditures for commodities. Hence, rela-
tive to total output Soviet outlays for final labor services became quite
large in dollars and U.S. outlays for such services notably small in
rubles (Table 3). An overvaluation of the ruble at this point, therefore,
could be important. Partly for this reason, in Table 1, I have compiled
comparative data. on GNP exclusive, as well as inclusive, of final labor
services. Among the use categories considered, final labor services are
especially important in communal services. The comparative results
obtained for such outlays must be read accordingly.
It remains to refer to one other source of incomparability, that re-
sulting from the treatment of retail trade services. In each country
prices of goods purchased at retail include trade markups. When
commodities are paired in the two countries, however, the character-
tend to be of relatively higher quality in final services than in other sectors, but it
should often be inferior to that in the United States. See, for example, Consumption,
For the services considered an additional source of bias favorable to the USSR
is the use of inputs as a surrogate for output, and together with this the omission
of any allowance for capital inputs. But this is a deficiency in the initial computa-
tion of national income in national prices, rather than in the deflation.158 Current International Comparisons
istics of the commodities alone are considered. Hence, no allowance is
made for differences in the quality of trade services through which the
commodities are supplied. As even the casual observer soon becomes
aware, quality of trade services does differ in the two countries. Partly
because of the relatively limited facilities available, partly because of
the difference in trade technology, and partly because of the chronic
shortages of goods in relation to demand, trade services in the USSR
must be, by any standard, markedly inferior to those in the United
States per unit of goods sold.'8 Here, too, therefore, the ruble must be
overvalued.
tativeness
Ruble-dollar price ratios for different groups of commodities (as
distinct from labor services) were compiled from more or less exten-
sive samples of price relatives. While care was taken to try to assure
that the samples were representative, that was often difficult, for the
price relatives for different kinds of commodities sometimes varied
widely. Resulting sampling errors could be correspondingly large. The
dispersion is especially great in the case of producers' durables. The
sample considered for these goods comprises over five hundred items
representing more than half of U.S. purchases of producers' durables,
but the parities derived could still err. For construction but twenty-
five pairs of projects could be considered, but curiously the resultant
price ratios do not vary very widely.
As for the direction of error, that is conjectural, but the samples
tend almost inevitably to be more representative of varieties of goods
produced in the USSR than of those produced in the United States.
Thus, higher-quality commodities produced in the United States often
had to be omitted because they had no counterpart in the USSR.
Such omissions do not affect the representativeness of parities compiled
with Soviet weights, but they do affect the representativeness of those
compiled wih U.S. weights. Very possibly here too there is a tendency
toward overvaluation of the ruble. Commodities not produced in the
USSR properly should be represented in the U.S. weighted parity, and
ideally at ruble prices corresponding to costs of producing very limited
supplies in the USSR. For goods that are of high quality in the United
18MarshallI. Goldman, Soviet Marketing, New York, 196S.USSR and U.S. Comparative National Income159
States,presumably the ruble prices in question would be especially
high. Hence, ruble-dollar parities would tend to shift against the
ruble with the inclusion of such goods.'9
Substitutions
Ruble-dollar price ratios compiled for one category of outlays almost
inevitably had often to be used in deflation of another. How the re-
suits are affected is uncertain, but it should he observed that the most
important example is the ratio for producers' durables. As indicated,
that was also used to deflate munitions procurement.
Appraisal Concluded
In sum, the parities used are subject to error at many points. The
direction of error is not always clear, and insofar as it is it is some-
times adverse and sometimes favorable to the ruble. Errors of the latter
sort, however, seem decidedly the more important (Table 4). By
implication, whether the calculations are in rubles or in dollars, Soviet
output probably is overstated relative to that of the United States.
In appraising the calculations, I have focused on the parities applied.
The comparative data on national income in national prices from
which I start also have their limitations, and so too does the translation
of such data into adjusted rubles, whether for the USSR or the United
States. Moreover, the adjusted rubles in any event leave something to
be desired analytically. This is also true of U.S. dollar prices, though
not to the same degree.2°
All this, however, is fairly familiar, and what must be of concern
now is whether such further deficiencies might offset or compound the
relative overstatement of Soviet output already noted. This could be
the subject of an essay in itself, and I can refer to only one aspect, but
it is an outstanding one: the possibility often suggested that Soviet
19Thedeficiency in parities at this point, it should be observed, is independent
of that due to incomparabilities resulting from matching U.S. products with sub.
standard Soviet products.
20Sofar as our comparative data in national prices are in error, the presumption
must be that the fault lies more with the data in rubles than with those in dollars.
On the reliability of ruble data such as are employed here, see Real SNIP. I also
discuss at length in that study the nature and limitations of further data such as
are compiled here in adjusted rubles.160 CurrentInternational Comparisons
TABLE 4
Biases in Ruble-Dollar Price Ratios Applied






Source of Bias of Ruble
Defective price quotations
Omission of state and local sales taxes from
U.S. retail prices, use of f.o.b. shippers'
prices for producers' durables —
Use of Soviet cost estimates for construction +
Mismatching of inferior quality goods +
Noncomparability of labor services +
Noncomparability of retail trade services +
Underrepresentation of high-quality goods + a
For ratios with United States, weights only.
real national income suffers relative to that of the United States be-
cause of the undervaluation of farm labor services, and so of farm
output, so far as it reflects that undervaluation.
How to value farm labor services is a matter on which students of
national income do not always agree, but itis usually assumed, I
think, that such services are accounted for ideally at a "real" wage
corresponding to that of industrial labor of the same skill, and at a
money wage corresponding to differential rural living costs. The prin-
ciple perhaps is not as compelling as has been supposed,21 and is also
21Insofaras rural living costs are below those in the city, application of the
principle must in itself tend to distort real national income comparisons, and in a
manner adverse to a country such as the USSR, where the agricultural labor force
isrelatively large. At least such distortion occurs where, as here, the ultimate
concernis with production potential. The principle becomes more defensible,
however, if national income data are compiled not for their own sake but for use
in the calculation of productivity. Farm labor services must then be valued as an
input, though at a relative money wage which also reflects the lower cost of rural
living. With such valuation, the distorting effect of differential living costs on
measures of comparative output is offset. See Bergson, Productivity.USSR and U.S. Comparative National Income161
not easy to apply. But it should be observed that in money terms the
typical farm worker in 1955 earned in the USSR some 5,244 rubles
per man-year, or 55 per cent of the average industrial wage; and in the
United States, some $1,762 per man-year, or 40 per cent of the average
industrial wage.22 Differentials in real earnings between farm and
industry in the two countries presumably are less than those in money
earnings indicated by these data. Also, especially in the USSR, skill
levels in the country must be markedly below those in the city.
But farm labor services may even so be undervalued. While the
undervaluation may occur in both countries, it necessarily would
operate to the disadvantage of the USSR. These further data suggest,
however, that the distortion cannot be serious:
GNP: USSR ÷ U.S. (per cent)
With Ad- With U.S.
justed Ruble Dollar
ValuationsValuations
As initially computed (Table 1) 27.6 45.2
With farm value added in each
country increased to 1.5 times
initial level 29.5 46.0
An increase in the average prices, net of materials cost, at which farm
output is valued to as much as 1.5 times the initial level apparently
would increase Soviet national income relative to that of the United
States, but only to a limited extent.23
OTHER COMPUTATIONS
Relative levels of prices and output in the USSR and the United
States have been the subject of a number of previous studies both by
Western scholars and Soviet agencies or individuals. I propose, where
possible, to compare summarily the data presented here with the re-
22 Ibid.
23 The recalculation in effect increases farm factor charges generally by 50 per
cent. In terms of adjusted rubles, farm factor charges consist almost exclusively of
wages, so the recalculation results in a more or less corresponding increase in labor
charges alone. In terms of dollar prices, farm factor charges include sizable non labor
charges; so the implied increase in labor charges alone is appreciably greater than
50 per cent. The recalculation uses the estimates of GNP by industrial origin pre-
sented below (National Income by Industrial Origin).162 CurrentInternational Comparisons
TABLE 5
Average Ruble-Dollar Price Ratios, Consumers' Goods
and Services, Kaplan-Wainstein and Bergson
K api an- W ai ns te i
Bergson,1955k' 1954b









Nonfood 17.4 18.4 11.5 20.6
Housing ].32 1.32 2.5 2.5
Housing; services 3.2 5.1 4.4 5.4
(I Takenfrom or calculated from data in CIA, Consumption (footnote 7, above). See
appendixes A and B.
Norman Kaplan and Eleanor S. Wainstein, "A Comparison of Soviet and American
Retail Prices in 1950,"Journal of Political Economy, December 1956, pp. 475, 486; "A
Note on Ruble-Dollar Comparisons," ibid., December 1957, p. 543. For housing Kaplan-
Wainstein parity for 1950,2.9,extrapolated to 1954 by reference to implicit deflator
for housing in National lncome—1966 (see footnote 4, above), pp. 162—163. The official
Soviet rental rate used in computing the 1950 parity still applies in 1954.
For the USSR, the Bergson parities refer to household purchases in state and co-
operative shops only. The corresponding Kaplan-Wainstein parities refer to prices in
these shops, though purchases in collective, farm markets are apparently considered in
determining commodity weights.
For figures in parentheses, alcoholic beverages have been shifted from foods to
nonfoods.
suits of the more interesting alternative computations that have been
made by others. While laborious, this comparison may contribute
further to the appraisal of calculations in a still relatively hazardous
field.
Kaplan-Wainstein
In Table 5 are shown a number of ruble-dollar price ratios for con-
sumers' goods and services that have been compiled by Norman M.
Kaplan and Eleanor S. Wainstein, together with corresponding paritiesUSSR and U.S. Comparative National Income163
usedin this study. As explained, the latter were taken from or derived
from data in a CIA report, Consumption (see footnote 7, above).
Soviet and U.S. prices changed only slightly from 1954 to 1955, so
although the Kaplan-Wainstein parities refer to 1954, this should have
very little effect on their comparability with the 1955 parities that I
use. For household purchases of commodities, I show the parities used
here and parenthetically, the corresponding parities with alcoholic
beverages classified with nonfoods rather than foods. The parenthetic
data are to be compared with those of Kaplan and Wainstein, who
likewise classify alcoholic beverages with nonfoods rather than foods.
Even so, the Kaplan-Wainstein parities sometimes differ markedly
from those used here. The sources of such differences are difficult to
summarize, but I should explain that, thorough as the Kaplan-Wain-
stein study is, I have felt it in order to rely instead on data in or de-
rived from Consumption, chiefly because the latter is a later study
resting on a larger sample of commodities (48 foods and 76 nonfoods,
versus 37 foods and. 57 nonfoods covered by Kaplan and Wainstein);
because the weights used, as is desirable here, relate to 1955, while
those used by Kaplan and Wainstein relate to 1954 for the USSR and
1950 for the United States; and because the Kaplan-Wainstein ruble-
dollar ratios for 1954 were extrapolated somewhat crudely from corre-
sponding ratios for 1950.
Although parities for housing services differ widely, in both cases
reference is to the official Soviet rental rate, on the one hand, and
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics rental data on the other. For this reason
it is difficult to choose between the two computations.24 The reasons
for my use here of the parities from Consumption for services other
than housing are much the same as those for using the corresponding
parities for commodities.25
24Theparity used here, however, is based, in the case of the U.S. rental rate, on
an extrapolation backward from 1959, and this may be more reliable than the
Kaplan-Wainstein one, which involves a corresponding extrapolation forward from
1950. The calculations also differ insofar as that relied on here deducts and the
Kaplan-Wainstein one includes kitchen space in computing the average U.S. rental
per square meter. If the kitchen space were included here, our ruble.dollar rental
parity would rise from 1.32 to 1.52. The calculations also differ regarding, among
other things, the discount for inferior Soviet quality. With the Kaplan-Wainstein
discount, our rental parity would rise further to 1.72.
25Referencefor the USSR is to services other than trade union and other dues,
which are deflated separately.164 Current International Comparisons
While the ruble-dollar price ratios applied in this study sometimes
differ much from those of Kaplan and Wainstein, it is reassuring that
the divergencies are not systematic. Thus, if I had deflated instead by
the Kaplan-Wainstein parities, total outlays in the categories in ques-
tion would be little affected:
Household Purchases of
Goods and Services 26
USSRUnited States
1. As originally calculated (billions of dollars) 51.8 3,221.4
2. Recomputed with Kaplan-Wainstein
parities (billions of dollars) 50.1 3,275.1
3. Ratio, (2) ÷ (1) (per cent) 96.7 101.7
Bornstein
The average ruble-dollar price ratios implied for consumption (in-
cluding communal services) in the present study, on the one hand, and
in the calculation of comparative Soviet and U.S. national income by
Morris Bornstein, on the other, are perhaps misleadingly close (Table
6). In any event, it should be observed that in deflating household
consumption Bornstein uses the Kaplan-'SAlainstein parities. These, to
repeat, sometimes differ widely from the parities used here. Also,
Bornstein values farm income in kind at urban retail prices. While
an allowance is made for distribution costs, this is quite small relative
to the spread between retail and realized farm prices, at least in the
USSR where retail prices include large turnover taxes. Hence, food-
stuffs constitute a larger share of household consumption for Born-
stein than in my computations, where farm income in kind is valued
at average realized farm prices. Parities for consumption generally,
especially that based on Soviet weights, are necessarily affected.27
26Forthe USSR, household purchases of goods in state and cooperative shops oniy.
27ForBornstein, Soviet consumption of farm income in kind amounts to 145.0
billion rubles. The corresponding figure obtained in this study is 80.4 billion rubles.
In allowing for distribution costs, Bornstein deducts but 12 per cent from Soviet
state and cooperative and 9 per cent from collective farm market prices. The cor-
responding deduction made from U.S. retail prices is not indicated, but if it is at
all comparable to those used for Soviet retail prices it would be much smaller than
the gap between retail and average realized farm prices in the United States: 59 per
cent in1955. See U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics, 1956,
Washington, D.C., 1957, p. 458. On Bornstein's calculations on consumption of farmUSSR and U.S. Comparative National Income165
TABLE6
Average Explicit or Implied Ruble-Dollar Price Ratios, 1955,
Bornstein and Bergson
Bergson Bornstein
With With With With
Soviet U.S. Soviet U.S.
WeightsWeightsWeightsWeights
Consumption, mci. corn munal
ices
serv-

















Defense 3.5 5.6 4 5
Gross investment
Producers' durables 4.1 6.4 4 6
Construction 7.0 7.1 6 3
Other 6.3 13.0 5 7
AU 5.7 7.5 5 7
GNP 6.3 10.9 6.1 12.1
Bornstein, in JEC, Comparisons(seefootnote 6, above), Part II, pp. 385—386,
For government administration, Bornstein deflates throughout by a
single parity relating to comparative money wage levels in the two
countries. I differ from him here chiefly insofar as I have deflated
separately (as is more correct) the nonwage component of this outlay
category.28 As the near agreement on parities for defense suggests,
Bornstein and I are more or less in accord on major components,
though here too there are interesting differences. Thus, Bornstein de-
flates military subsistence by a parity relating to commodity prices. I
treat such subsistence as a part of military earnings, and translate it
income in kind, see Morris Bornstein et al., "Soviet National Accounts for 1955"
(processed), 1961, pp. 103ff.
28 The divergence between Bornstein and me for wages alone occurs primarily
because for the USSR, I include here militarized internal security forces that Born-
stein classifies with defense.166 Current International Comparisons
TABLE 7









Bornstein 1,285.8 4,802.1 26.8
Bergson 1,143.2 4,349.1 26.3
In U.S. Dollars
Bornstein 212.4 397.5 53.4
IBergson 180.8 399.56 45.2
along with military pay by reference to a parity for wages of military
labor services.29
In deflating gross investment, Bornstein admittedly often proceeds
rather arbitrarily. I may have been able to improve on his calculations
at this point, but as it turns out, our parities for major components
of gross investment differ little.
While Bornstein and I are frequently more or less in accord on
average ruble-dollar price ratios for major categories, we differ widely
in our comparative data on gross national product (Table 7). For the
United States, the divergence results mainly from the fact that our
parities do differ, especially for consumption, by far the chief outlay.
For the USSR, differences in parities also matter, but the divergence
in our measures of GNP occurs chiefly because, as already noted,
Bornstein values farm income in kind at approximately retail prices.
Valuation here at average realized farm prices is in conformity with
the conventional procedure, and is also, I believe, theoretically more
appropriate where production potentialis appraised. The implied
omission of home processing from farm income in kind, however, is a
limitation.3° Bornstein also includes in the Soviet GNP admittedly
29Jrefer to military subsistence as a component of defense. The Bornstein pro-
cedure is proper, and is followed here for military subsistence as a component of
household consumption.
30Onthe difference between Bornstein and me regarding the ruble value of farm
income in kind, see footnote 27, above. Bornstein does not supply a breakdown ofUSSR and U.S. Comparative National Income167
highlyconjectural estimates of "concealed" defense expenditures. The
explicit budgetary figure that I rely on instead is no doubt an under-
estimate, but some extrabudgetary defense expenditures find their way
into other outlay categories, and so are still represented in GNP as
calculated. Our calculations also differ to some extent at other points.
Despite all divergencies, Bornstein and I hardly differ, on the rela-
tion of Soviet and U.S. output in rubles. We differ markedly, however,
on the corresponding magnitude obtained from dollar valuations
(Table 7).
Kats
Diverse ruble-dollar price ratios for different categories of goods are
found in various Soviet sources. I shall consider here only a few Soviet-
weighted ones given or implied in a calculation of Soviet "final social
product" by final use in dollar prices by A. I. Kats. "Final social
product" isa relatively novel concept in Soviet national income
accounting, and as Kats makes clear,3' also a controversial one, but
essentially it is nothing other than "national income" as usually un.
derstood in the USSR, but before the deduction of depreciation on
"productive capital." Final social product thus corresponds broadly
to "gross national product" as usually understood in the West, but
diverges from the latter in a famous way so far as final social product
fails to include a variety of personal and other final services.
The scope of different use categories considered is also sometimes
strange to Western eyes. In juxtaposing Kats's parities with mine (Table
8), therefore, I focus on only the final social product as a whole, and
two major uses which could also be delineated in essentials in my cal-
culations.32 In addition to the comparisons in the table, two further
Soviet household consumption indollars but presumably his estimate of Soviet
farm income in kind in dollars markedly exceeds mine of $5.8 billion.
31 cit.,Chap. 1.
32 The scope of the two use categories will be sufficiently clear if I explain that
for comparison with "fund of personal and social consumption," I aggregate these
outlays in my calculations:(i) "Household consumption," excluding housing, and
diverse other services, principally of a personal sort; (ii) "communal services," outlays
for commodities only;(iii) "government administration, outlays for commodities
only; and (iv) depreciation on housing and other "nonproductive" capital, including
that in education, health care, and government administration. As indicated, the
second use category considered isitself an aggregate of a number delineated in
Kats (Table 8). For comparison with this I aggregate these use categories in my168 Current international Comparisons
TABLE 8
Average Explicit or Implied Ruble-Dollar Price Ratios
(Soviet Weights), Kats and Bergson
Category in Soviet Data 1959
Bergson
1955
"Fund of personal and social consumption" 9.0 12.7
"Growth of consumption capital"; "Replacementand
accumulation of productive fixed capital";
"Growth of stock and other outlays" 4.7 5.6
"Final social product" 6.9 9.0
a A.1. Kats, Proizvoditel'nost' tntda v SSSR i glavnykh stranakh, Mos-
cow, 1964, Pp. 51ff. Kats's parities are multiplied by 10 to put them in ternis of the pre—
1961 Soviet monetary unit considered in this essay.
ones may be made. As he explains, Kats uses a parity of 6.4 rubles to
the dollar for housing construction, and one of 3.7 rubles to the
dollar for other construction. In my calculations, the parity for hous-
ing is 6.6 rubles to the dollar, and for construction generally 7.0
rubles to the dollar.
Kats's parities and mine evidently diverge markedly, his being con-
sistently more favorable to the ruble than mine. My parities relate to
1955 and his to 1959. Dollar prices rose moderately from 1955 to
1959, the GNP deflator having risen by 11.8 per cent by the end of
the interval. During the same period, ruble prices apparently were
relatively By implication, a part of the difference in parities
must be due to the difference in dates considered. For the rest, Kats
calculations:(i) "Gross investment," less depreciation on housing and other non-
productive capital; (ii) "defense," other than military pay and subsistence. Note that
as a form of consumption (as distinct from a form of income) military subsistence
is already included in my household consumption. In rearranging my accounts in
the foregoing ways, I draw on data in appendixes A and B and in the sources
cited there.
33Accordingto official data, wholesale prices of industrial goods, inclusive of the
turnover tax in 1960, were the same as in 1955. Retail prices in 1959 in govern-
ment and co.operative shops were 1.4 per cent above those of 1955, while those in
the collective farm market were below the earlier level. Average money wages,
however, rose by 10.5 per cent over the interval in question. See National Income—
1966, pp. 158—59; Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravienie (hereafter, TSU), Narodnoe
khoziaistvo SSSR v 1960 godu, Moscow, 1961, pp. 717, 737; TSU, Narodnoe khoziaistvo
SSSR v 1965 g., Moscow, 1966, pp. 167, 567.USSR and U.S. Comparative National Income169
explainsthat his parities are compiled largely from data of the Minis-
try of Trade and have their limitations. For example, the sample of
commodities considered is "not always sufficiently broad," and parities
within commodity "groups" are often averaged arithmetically without
weights, while no account is taken of the high prices prevailing in
collective farm markets in the USSR. From the meager information
supplied on the underlying calculations, however, itisdifficult to
judge their reliability. The difference in our results must be viewed
in this light.
NATIONAL INCOME BY INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN
The comparative data on national income by industrial origin are set
forth in Table 9. As before, I refer particularly to gross national
product. The contribution of a sector to that output consists, there-
fore, of its "value added," as usually understood, though reference
here, of course, is to additional value gross of
Data on gross national product in different valuations are those al-
ready derived in the calculations of output by final use. This is also
true of the figures on the value added of selected final services, since,
except for housing, such value added consists only of wages, and data
on wages paid in the services in question have already been compiled
in the calculations on output by final use.35 For housing, it seemed
best to refer to final outlays, as also derived previously, rather than to
try to disentangle value added from materials inputs in these outlays.
In Table 9, nonfarm value added was calculated as a residuaL8°
Hence, in computing national income by industrial origin it remained
only to determine the value added of agricuture. Essentially, such
value added is obtained as the excess of net farm output (i.e., farm
output net of production expenses in kind) over other material inputs
34As Professor Kuznets has made clear to me, at least for the United States, the
sectoral data Sometimes more nearly represent "gross domestic product originating"
than "value added," insofar as the principal sectoral contributions are net not only
of materials but of productive services obtained outside the sector.
See appendix tables 1 and 6. In Table 9, I consider for "defense" the earnings,
including subsistence, of military personnel only, wages paid civilians under "de-
fense" in the United States being assumed to be more correctly classified as nonfarm
income.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)USSR and U.S. Comparative National Income171
toagriculture. Net farm output and material inputs to agriculture,
other than production expenses in kind, are determined for each coun-
try initially in terms of its own currency, and then translated into the
other's currency by application of suitably weighted ruble-dollar
parities. Here and in the further translation made from prevailing to
adjusted rubles, I rely on sources and methods such as were used in the
compilation of comparative data on output by final use. Details are in
Appendix C.
These calculations are often crude, and any error at this point neces-
sarily affects as well the calculation of non farm output as a residual.
The resultant error in nonfarm output would not be at all propor-
tionate, however, for the nonfarm sector is by far the larger one in both
countries (Table 9). Since the figures on selected final services that
have been used are also inexact, the data compiled on national income
by industrial origin must, in general, be considered to be relatively
tentative, but they still have the merit that they permit further com-
parison of the computations of this essay with previous work by others.
Thus, the data compiled on relative output of the two countries in the
farm and nonfarm sectors may be juxtaposed with similar measures
compiled by others. While illuminating the reliability of my calcula-
tions, the juxtaposition may also provide a useful perspective on pre-
vious findings on relative output by sector. Even among Western
studies, these have sometimes diverged widely. As a result, comparative
sector output has been a notably controversial theme.
Farm Output
The comparative data compiled here on value added of agriculture
in the USSR and the United States appear to be the first of their sort,
but computations have been made previously of the relative levels of
farm output in the two countries, where output is more or less gross of
material inputs. The results of three such computations are shown in
Table 10, together with my measures of value added. I also show cor-
responding measures compiled here on "net farm output," representing
total output less production expenses in kind, and "net farm output,
adjusted," or net farm output after the further deduction of purchased
farm inputs.
Of the three computations by others, two—one by the U..S. Depart-172 Current International Comparisons
TABLE 10
Comparative Farm Output, USSR and United States,
Alternative Computations
.





Net output, 1955 55.2 63.1
Net output, adjusted, 1955 60.1 70.1
Value added, 1955 66.1 74.2
U.S. Dept. of Ag.: "Production," 1958
a 62.5
(53.5) b






U.S. Department of Agriculture, The World Agricultural Situation, 1961, Washing-
ton, D.C.
°Data in parentheses obtained by extrapolation to 1955. For the USSR, see Douglas
B. Diamond, "Trends iiiOutput,Inputs and Factor Productivity in Soviet Agriculture,"
inJEC, New Directions in the Soviet Economy (hereafter, New Directions), Part 11-B, 89th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966, p. 346. For the United States, see National Income—1966,
pp. 28—29.
Frederic L. Pryor and George j. Staller, "The Dollar Value of the Gross National
Product in Eastern Europe, 1955," Economics of Planning, 1966, no. I, p. 7.
"L.P. Zlomanov and I. I. Kotkovskii, "Sopostavlenie ob'eiiiov sel'skokhoziaistvennogo
proizvodstva SSSR i SSHA," Sorevnovanie dvukh sistem, Moscow, 1965, p. 323.
ment of Agriculture, the other by Frederic L. Pryor and George J.
Staller—are in dollar prices. Both indicate a level of Soviet output rela-
tive to that of the United States distinctly less than is shown by any of
my measures in dollar prices. Note that in the case of the Agricultural
Department computation Soviet output is already relatively low for
1958, the year studied, but becomes still lower if the calculated output
ratio for that year is extrapolated to 1955, the year I consider. The
third computation, by two Soviet writers,L.P. Zlomanov and
I. I. Kotkovskii, values output in both rubles and dollars. Extrapolated
to 1955 from 1959, the year they consider, their measures approximateUSSR and U.S. Comparative National Income173
minefor net output adjusted, but are more favorable to the USSR than
mine for net output without adjustment.
Such varying results tend to underline the margin of error in all
computations alike, and perhaps mine not least, but, partly because of
the limited detail at hand on the calculations made previously, inter-
pretation of their divergences from my measures is not easy. The reader
will wish to know, however, that for the Agricultural Department and
for Pryor and Staller "production" apparently corresponds broadly
with net output adjusted, as construed in this essay. Their calculations,
however, do sometimes differ in scope from mine for that category.
For example, in the case of Pryor and Stafler, even production expenses
in kind are deducted only for grain, potatoes, and milk.37 Index num-
bers of farm output were compiled by Pryor and Staller by aggregation
of quantities of different products, rather than by deflation, as was done
here, and that apparently was also the procedure of the Agricultural
Department. The dollar prices of the Agricultural Department are
those in world markets (i.e., wholesale or export prices in major ex-
porting countries) and these must often differ markedly from the dollar
average realized farm prices that are considered in this essay. The
"wholesale" dollar prices used by Pryor and Staller must also diverge
from the latter. Because of sharp differences in production structure in
the USSR and the United States,38 such divergencies in price weights
could be important.
Zlomanov and Kotkovskii focus on "gross production" as understood
in the USSR, i.e., even production expenses in kind are not deducted.
Among the different categories of output I consider, therefore, gross
production is most comparable to net output, but isstill "grosser"
than the latter. Farm output is calculated by aggregation of quantities
37 See Frederic L. Pryor and George J. Staller, "The Dollar Value of the Gross
National Product in Eastern Europe, 1955," Economics of Planning, 1966, no.1,
pp. 6—7, 20. As for the Agricultural Department data, in a letter of August 1, 1960,
the late Lazar Volin informed me that these "...attemptto represent roughly net
agricultural production. Included are gross crop production, minus feed, seed and
waste; the gross output of livestock products without allowance for animals pro-
duced and added (net) to the national herd minus milk fed to animals (for some
countries), and minus an allowance for livestock products produced with imported
feed in Western and Eastern Europe. No deduction was made for inputs from the
non-agricultural sector, such as chemicals, machinery, fuel and other materials."
38 See appendix tables 8 and 10.174 Current International Comparisons
of different products, though the nature of the ruble and dollar prices
considered is unexplained.39 Soviet official statistics on the output of
different farm products are believed often to be inflated.40 If only be-
cause of the use of such data, the Zlomanov-Kotkovskii calculation
is apt to be unduly favorable to the USSR.
Industrial Output
Divergencies are also evident between my measures of nonfarm out-
put in the USSR and the United States, and similar data compiled pre-
viously (Table 11). The latter data in all cases relate, however, to
"industry." This is in the Soviet sense, and thus includes not only
manufacturing, but mining and utilities. But even so "industry" still
• falls short of the nonfarm sector as understood here, which also in-
cludes construction, transportation, and trade. This difference in scope
presumably affects the comparative results of my calculations and the
previous ones, though just how is not very clear.
We may also compare explicit or implied ruble-dollar price ratios
(Table 12) in all but one of the earlier computations with mine. The
difference in scope may not be as important here as in the comparison
of physical volume. In any event, parities are of prior interest in this
inquiry, since no data even in national currencies have been compiled
here on industry as such.
My calculations, however, continue to diverge from the others. For
parities as for physical volume, the difference in scope must be a factor,
though its import is still difficult to judge. For the rest, the limitations
of my calculations may again be relevant, but the previous calculations,
as their authors usually make clear, are also subject to error. Thus, all
rest on one or another or both of two dubious, though understandable,
assumptions: (i) the value added per unit of output of different prod-
ucts in either currency is the same in the two countries; and (ii) value
added per unit of output is proportional to the price of the product.
The calculations are also obviously often crude at other points, and
The "comparable" ruble prices used in Soviet calculations of Soviet farm output
over time, however, turn out to be of a complex sort. See Roger E. Ncetz, "Inside
the Agricultural Index of the USSR," in JEC,NewDirections in the Soviet Economy,
Part lI-B, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966, pp. 486ff.
40 See Douglas B. Diamond, "Trends in Output, Inputs and Factor Productivity,"
in ibid., pp. 96ff.USSR and U.S. Comparative National Income175
TABLE11
Comparative Nonfarm and Industrial Output, USSR and
United States, Alternative Corn pti tations




Bergson: Value added, nonfarm, 1955 20.0 33.3
Nutter: Value added, industry, 1955 " 19.7 23.4
Campbell-Tarn: Value added, industry,USSR,








Revenko: "Production," industry, 19601 58
C. Warren N titter, Growl/i of Ind'ustrial Production in the Soviet Union, Princeton V ni—
versity Press for NBER, 1962, pp. 237—342.
Alexander Tarn, "A Comparison of Dollar and Ruble Values of theI nclustrial
Output of the United States and USSR," Soviet Studies, April 1968, pp. 484—86.
Figures in parentheses obtained by extrapolation of U.S. data to 1955. For U.S.
industrial output, see Federal Reserve Bulletin, January 1968,A-56.
"Judith Thornton, "Estimation of Value Added atici Average Returns to Capital in
Soviet industry from Cross Section Data,"Journai of Political Economy, December 1965,
j).631.
Figures in obtained by extrapolation to 1955. For U.S. industrial pro-
duction, see note c. For that of the USSR, see R, V. Greenslade and Phyllis Wal-
"Industrial Production in the USSR," in JEC, Dimensions of Soviet Economic
Power, 87th Cong., 2ndSess., 1962, p.120. For Soviet industrial production for
Revenko, however, see Narkhoz—]964, p. 124.
A. F. Revenko, pokazatelei /iromyshlennogo proizvod.slva SSSR i SSHA,
Moscow, 1966, p. 48.
it may not be amiss to feel that the difference between my parities and
the others originates partly in these circumstances. In Tarn's computa-
tion (representing a revision and elaboration of earlier ones made in
collaboration with Robert W. Campbell), the difference in date must
also be a factor. This may be true too for the computation of Thorn-
ton. It is not clear, however, to what extent, if at all, parities for 1955
from which she begins (actually compiled from much the same in-176 CurrentInternational Comparisons
TABLE 12
Explicit or Implied Ruble-Dollar Price Ratios, Soviet and U.S.




Bergson: Value added, nonfarm,1955 12.7 7.9
with rubles adjusted 9.5 5.7
With rubles net of turnover tax
Nutter: Value added, industry,1955 a 8.7 7.3
Tarn-Campbell: Value added,industry,USSR,
1959, U.S., 1963 b






Nom: Complete citations are given in footnotes to Table Ii, above.
"Growth of Industrial Production, p. 380.
bSOvjet Studies, April 1968, pp. 484—85. Parity with Soviet weights implied in alterna-
tive computations of Soviet value added of 1955 in rubles of 1959 and dollars of 1963.
Parity with U.S. weights implied in alternative computations of U.S. value added of
1963 in rubles of 1959 and dollars of 1963. Post-January, 1961, rubles converted here
to pre-January, 1961, rubles at the rate of ten of the latter to one of the former.
CJournalof Political Economy, December 1965, p. 631. Post-January 1961 converted
here to pre-January 1961 rubles as in footnote b.
formation on ruble-dollar relations as I use) are adjusted to relate to
1960. That is the year on which she focuses.41
41Tobe somewhat more specific regarding the different calculations, Nutter's
deflators (see Table 11, footnote a, above) are explicit rather than implied, and are
derived by aggregating average parities for "intermediate products and consumer
non-durables," on the one hand, and "machinery and equipment" on the other.
Those for "intermediate products and consumers' durables" are calculated from
value added data in national currencies and output relatives, and thus rest on
assumption(i). Assumption (ii)is introduced because some of the parities con-
sidered for machinery and equipment relate to prices rather than value added per
unit.
Thornton (Table 11, footnote d, above) describes her computations only sum-
marily. Essentially value added in each of three sectors, "light industry," "food-
processing," and "all other industry" is deflated by parities relating to product
prices. While the parities are adjusted for turnover taxes, the calculation evidently
still involves assumption (ii). Tarn (Table 11, footnote b, above) proceeds rather by
the alternative method of aggregating output relatives with value added weights,
though for machinery and equipment this output relative is determined by defla-
tion. His calculation thus rests on assumption (i).
While the foregoing methodological features must be consequential, one wondersUSSR and U.S. Comparative National Income177
TheSoviet writer A. F. Revenko describes the methods and pro-
cedures used in deriving his index of Soviet industrial output relative
to that of the United States, but supplies hardly any details of the
actual computations. Essentially the concern is to measure "gross ouput
by the factory method," as understood in the USSR. This requires
adjustment of American production data to allow for differences be-
tween the United States and the USSR in plant specialization. That
must often be difficult to do. Comparative data are compiled primarily
by the aggregation of physical quantities in identical prices. Recourse
is also had, however, to deflation in order to include output of "incom-
parable" products and the like.
Gross National Product
In the study already cited, Pryor and Staller compile comparative
data on Soviet and U.S. output not only for agriculture but for other
sectors. For industry they rely on the calculations of Tarn and Camp-
bell that were considered above, but by aggregating sectoral data they
find that in 1955 the Soviet gross national product was 44 per cent of
that of the United States. That is with output valued primarily in
dollar prices, but with "services" assumed to be less productive in the
USSR than in the United States. With services taken to be equally
productive in the two countries, the corresponding figure is 50 per
cent.42 With such a treatment of services, I find that in 1955 in dollar
prices the Soviet gross national product was 45 per cent of the United
States. These comparative results must be read, of course, in the light
whether more detailed aspects may not sometimes be at least comparably so.
Suffice it to mention the use by Nutter of a U.S.-weighted parity for machinery and
equipment that is taken from Becker, Prices, without adjustment for the difference
between. July 1 and average 1955 prices (one of the infrequent general revisions of
Soviet wholesale industrial prices occurred on July 1, 1955) and for the omission of
metalworking machine tools; his crude extrapolation of that parity to obtain a
corresponding one with Soviet weights; the use by Tarn of ruble-dollar ratios,
which were clearly often determined rather arbitrarily in the CIA study drawn on,
as parities for different types of machinery and equipment; and Thornton's apparent
use as parities for "all other industry" of ruble-dollar ratios for producers' durables
that Bornstein adapted, 1 believe, in part more or less arbitrarily from Becker,
Prices.
Dollar and ruble. price trends from 1955 to later years if anything should have
been somewhat favorable to the ruble. See National Income—1966, pp. 160—61, and
above (footnote 23).
42 Economics of Planning, 1966, no. 1, pp. 2, 15.178 Current InternationalComparisons
of divergencies noted between my calculations and those of Pryor and
Staller for agriculture and between my calculations for the noiifarm
sector and those of Tarn and Campbell for industry.
CONCLUSIONS
My calculations, although inexact, may shed further light on the com-
parative volume and structure of output in the USSR and the United
States. In 1955, at the end of the fifth Five Year Plan, the USSR still
lagged far behind the United States in total output. Thus, Soviet GNP
is found to be but 28 per cent of that of the United States if valued in
rublesand 45 per cent of that of the United States if valued in dollars
(Table 1).
Relations of different uses and sources of output in the two countries
are very broadly similar to that for the GNP itself, but there are often
incongruities. To refer to only a few of outstanding interest, reflecting
the special nature of the growth process in the USSR, particularly the
famous "Soviet model," and related defense policies, that country com-
pares much more favorably with the United States in nonconsumption
than in consumption. Thus, Soviet nonconsumption is 43 per cent of
American nonconsumption in rubles and 63 per cent in dollars. Soviet
consumption, however, is but 22 per cent of American consumption
in rubles and 37 per cent in dollars (Table 1).
As late as 1955, however, application of the Soviet model had only
very partially compensated for the "later start" by the USSR. The
result, as not always understood, was that the USSR still compared
much more favorably with the United States in farm than in nonfarm
output. In agriculture, the Soviet Union produced 66 per cent as much
as the United States in rubles and 74 per cent as much as the United
States in dollars. In the nonfarm sector, however, the USSR was but 20
per cent as productive as the United States in rubles and 33 per cent
as productive in dollars (Table 9).
Because of the larger population in the USSR, comparisons in per
capita terms are necessarily less favorable to that country than those
of an absolute sort. Suffice it to say that the Soviet GNP per capita is 23
per cent of that of the United States in rubles and 38 per cent in
43Hereand later, ruble data cited are of the adjusted variety.USSR and U.S. Comparative National Income179
dollars. The corresponding figures for per capita consumption are but
19 and 31 per cent. In per capita nonconsumption, however, the USSR
is 36 per cent of the United States in rubles and 53 per cent in dollars
(Table 2).
As the cited findings illustrate, we encounter at almost every point
in striking degree the familiar phenomenon of index number rela-
tivity. Measures in terms of alternative valuations diverge markedly.
This is perhaps not very surprising in view of the still relatively limited
advance of industrialization in the USSR compared with the United
States. The index number relativity is hardly more pronounced than
that observed in a comparison of Italian per capita output with that
of the United States (below, Table 15). According to a number of in-
dicators, the USSR and Italy should have been at a broadly similar
stage of industrialization in the years considered.44 Moreover, as for
Italy, so for the USSR, the calculation in foreign national prices is less
favorable to the foreign country than is that in dollars. That is, of
course, in conformity with the pattern for Western countries generally
that Gilbert and Kravis observed long ago.45 It is also the pattern that
is theoretically to be expected.46 Its appearance here, therefore, is surely
to the good.
Index number relativity reflects differences in price and output
structure, and conformity of the relativity observed here to the normal
pattern is to the good at least in part because that is further reassurance
on the matter alluded to at the outset: the usability of ruble prices for
national income measurement. From the same standpoint, though, it
should be observed that, as revealed in data compiled for this study,
the Soviet price structure differs not only from that of the United States
but also from that of Italy, a country which, to repeat, seems to be at a
similar economic stage as the USSR. The differences are sometimes
striking (Table 13). Perhaps most notable are the low prices of pro-
ducers' durables relative to foodstuffs in the USSR, compared with not
only Italy but even the United States. Expectations of many pro-
ponents to the contrary notwithstanding, socialism, as found in the
USSR, has clearly meant cheap machines rather than cheap food.
See Bergson, Productivity.
45 See footnoteabove,and Table 13, footnote a, below.
46 See Bergson, Productivity.180 CurrentInternational Comparisons
TABLE 13
Explicit or Implied Ruble-Dollar Price Ratios, 1955, and
Lira-DollarPrice Ratios, 1950 a
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GNP 100 100 100 100 100 100
Consumption
All 122 118 110 111 102 102
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Education 49 46 56 40
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All 90 69 106 85 139 103
Producers' durables 65 59 247 159
Construction 111 65 90 56
ruble-dollar ratios; see appendixes A and B; lira-dollar ratios, Milton Gilbert
and Associates, Comparative National Products and Price Levels, Paris, OEEC, 1958.
bForruble-dollar ratios, includes alcoholic beverages.
Here and elsewhere, however, peculiarities in the Soviet price struc-
ture have to be read in the light of the distinctive nature of the "Soviet
model" generally. From that standpoint, the peculiarities must often
connote a correspondence of ruble prices to "scarcity values" rather
than the reverse, and necessarily it is conformity of a country's pricesUSSR and U.S. Comparative National Income181
to its own scarcity values that counts for national income measure-
ment. But, while implications of the present study for the ruble price
structure are properly underlined, I cannot reopen the large issue
concerning the limitations of ruble prices for national income valua-
tion, and so will say no more about that question.
In this essay, I took as an ultimate desideratum the compilation of
data on national income that might illuminate comparativeduction
potential. However the ruble-dollar price ratios are read, the national
income measures compiled are certainly remote from the sort ideally
prescribed by theOry for that purpose. As still is not always grasped,
though, on an analytic plane divergent index numbers such as have
been observed imply a related divergence in. capacity to produce differ-
ent output mixes. Thus, relative to that of the United States, Soviet
output is, to repeat, smaller in rubles than in dollars. Theoretically,
the implication is that Soviet productive capacity compares more
favorably with that of the United States regarding its own output mix
than regarding the American one. With all the limitations of our
measures, that is certainly a plausible result.47
I have referred to three Soviet calculations of comparative output
in the USSR and the United States, one of agricultural output in
rubles and dollars, another of national income in dollars, and a third
of industrial output in dollars. It should be observed that in the case
of the second and third, the authors expressly choose to value output
in dollars rather than rubles. That is done avowedly for diverse
reasons, principally the relatively low value attached to "means of
production" compared with "means of consumption" when computa-
tions are in rubles. As a result, with a ruble valuation, the calculated
volume of Soviet relative to American output is "artificially" reduced.48
According to the calculations of this essay, with the dollar valuation
stressed in the USSR, Soviet output is raised relative to that of the
United States. Indeed, though the contrary is sometimes asserted in the
47 It must be assumed that "production possibilities," or more correctly the
"feasibility locus," is concave or at least not very convex to the origin. See Richard
H.Moorsteen, "On Measuring Productive Potential and RelativeEfficiency,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1961; Real SNIP, Chap.3;Bergson,
Productivity.
48 Kats, op. cit., pp. 49—51; A. F. Revenko, Sopostavienie pokazatelei proizvodstva
SSSR I SSHA, Moscow, 1966, pp. 49—51.182 CurrentInternational Comparisons
TABLE 14
Gross National Product, Selected Final Uses, and Sectoral
Contributions, USSR and United States, Comparative
Volume, 1955 and 1965 a
(UnitedStates =100)
1955 1965
With RubleWith DollarWith RubleWith Dollar
ValuationValuationValuationValuation
GNP 27.5 45.2 35.0 57.5
Consumption 22.5 36.8 24.4 40.3
Nonconsumption 43.0 62.6 72.7 98.1
Value added, farni 66.1 74.2 71.9 76.5
Value added, nonfarm20.0 33.3 29.3 51.6
GNP per capita 23.2 38..! 29.5 48.5
Consumption
per capita 18.8 31.0 20.6 34.0
Nonconsumption
per capita 36.3 52.8 61.4 82.8
Data for 1955 in Tables 1, 2, and 9,extrapolated to 1965on following basis:
GNP: For 1965, as per cent of 1955, taken to be 178.4 for USSR and 140.3 for the
United States, as indicated by data in Stanley H. Cohn, "Comparative Growth Record
of the Soviet Economy," in John Hardt et al., "Recent Soviet Performance: Selected
Aspects," Research Analysis Corporation, August 1968, p. 18; National income-.1966,
pp. 4—5.
Consumption: For 1965, as per cent of 1955, taken to be 160.2 for USSR, as indi-
cated by David W. Bronson and Barbara S. Severin, "Recent Trends in Consumption
and Disposable Money Income in theUSSR," inJEC,New Directions, Part Il-B, p.52!.
The corresponding index for the United States is taken to be 146.3, as indicated by the
following data in billions of 1958 dollars:
19551965
Personal consumption expenditures 274.2396.2
Government purchases of goods and services, less
public construction, for "health and hospitals,"
"sanitation," "veterans benefits and services:
hospitalsand medical care"; "education" 15.527.6
All 289.7423.8
For personal consumption expenditures, see National Income—1966, pp. 48—49. Govern-
ment purchases of goods and services for indicated items in current dollars from ibid.,
pp. 62—69, 80—8 1.1 deflate by the implicit GNP deflator for state and local expendi-
tures, as given in ibid., pp. 158—59.
Nonconsumption: Calculated as a residual.
Value added, farm: For USSR, net farm output, adjusted, less nonfarm material
inputs to agriculture, the 1965 amounts of which are taken tobe 135.7 and 190 per centUSSR and U.S. Comparative National Income183
Notesto Table 14(concluded)
respectivelyof the corresponding 1955 totals (appendix Table 7). See Douglas B. Dia-
mond, "Trends in Output, Inputs and Factor Productivity in Soviet Agriculture," in
JEC,NewDirections, Part IT-B, p. 348. For the United States, the difference between
net farm output and "intermediate products other than rents," the 1965 amounts of
which are taken as 121.8 and 133.3 per cent respectively of the corresponding 1955
totals (appendix Table 9). See National Incoine—1966, pp. 28—29.
Value added, nonfarm: Calculated as a residual after allowance for farm value added
and the following data on selected final services iii 1965 in 1955 p1-ices (billions):
USSR United States
in Ad- In Ad-
justedIn Do!-justedIn Dol-
RubleslarsRubleslars
Health care, ed., govt. adimn.,
wages 123.2 59.3 74.7 37.4
Defense: military pay
and subsistence 21.3 9.7 19.3 8.8
Housing, gross outlays 14.5 11.2 71.4 54.7
All 159.0 80.2 165.4100.9
For the USSR, I extrapolate from 1955 data in appendix Table 1, by reference to em-
ployment data in Murray Feshbach, "Manpower in the USSR," in JEC, New Directions,
Part III, pp. 746, 770—73, and Real SNIP, p. 364; and data on housing space in Oleg
Hoeffding and Nancy Nimitz, "Soviet National Income and Product, 1949—55," RAND
RM-2101, Santa Monica, Calif., April 6, 1959, pp. 100—103; Real SNIP, pp. 315—3 16;
and Abraham S. Becker, Soviet National Income, 1958—1964, Berkeley, Calif., 1969,
pp. 335ff. For the United &ates, I extrapolate from 1955 data in appendix Table 6 by
reference to employment data in National Income—1966, pp. 110—11, and data on hous-
ing outlays in 1958 prices in ibid., pp. 48—49.
GNP, consumption and nonconsumption per capita: For 1955 population, see
Table 2. Population 1965, for USSR, 230.6 million; for the United States, 194.6 million.
USSR, the increase is marked.4° Granting the limitations of ruble
prices, however, that result far from being "artificial" is, as indicated,
the expected one.
I have focused in this essay on 1955, a year for which available data
are favorable to calculations such as mine. It may be hoped that with
further research similar calculations will become possible for more
recent dates. Meantime, we are able to extrapolate some of the major
findings by using available related measures of changes in physical
volume over time in the two countries.
If the results (Table 14) are at all near the mark, we may conclude
that over the decade 1955—65 the USSR has gained on the United
States in every sphere, but very unevenly. Hence, structural differences
49 V.Starovskii,"Sopostavlenie ekonomicheskikh pokazatelei SSSRiSSHA,"
Voprosy ekonomiki, 1960, no. 4, p. 107.184 Current International Comparisons
that prevailed initially are sometimes ameliorated, as where the Soviet
relative standing in respect of nonfarm output gains on that in respect
of farm output. But they are sometimes compounded; for example,
the Soviet relative standing in consumption, if anything, suffers in
comparison with that in nonconsumption. As reported, Soviet con-
sumption has risen sharply since the mid-fifties, but so too has U.S.
consumption. As it turns out, the USSR still surpasses the United States
much more in the growth of nonconsumption than of consumption.
Interestingly, in total volume of nonconsumption, the USSR actually
matches the United States in 1960, with valuation in dollars, though
it still lags with valuation in rubles.
I have focused on comparisons of the USSR with the United States,
but other countries too have been compared with the United States,
and the USSR may be thus contrasted, if only indirectly, with them
as well. Thus, in terms of per capita GNP the USSR apparently was
more or less on a par with Italy in 1955 and still remained so in 1965
TABLE 15
Comparative GNP per Capita, by Final Use,
Italy and United States, 1955 and 1965 a
(United States =100)
1955 1965
























a For1955, see Milton Gilbert arid Associates, Comparative National and Price
Levth, Paris, OEEC, 1958, pp. 36, 86, Magnitudes in this source for 1955 extrapolated
to 1965 by reference to calculations for the United States explained in notes to Table
14, and to data in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, General
Statistics, January 1965, p. 77, and Economic Survey of Europe in 1966, New York, 1967,
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(Tables14 and 15). In contrast to the extreme disproportion between
consumption and nonconsumption in the USSR, however, the two sorts
of outlays enjoy practically the same balance in Italy as in the United
States in 1955. By 1965, Italy stood higher relative to the United States
in nonconsumption than in consumption, but the disproportion is still
hardly comparable to that in the USSR. The USSR thus has only been
able to match Italy in overall growth while enjoying much less of its
fruits in the form of consumption than has that country. The partial
reason must be that nonconsumption includes not only growth-induc-
ing investment but defense outlays, and that the latter have been rela-
tively larger in the USSR than in Italy. Familiar doubts about the
efficacy of the famous Soviet growth model, however, seem here com-
pounded, but this must be the subject of another inquiry and cannot
be pursued now.
COMMENT
RUSH V. GREENSLADE, Central Intelligence Agency
First, I wish to comment briefly on the data and procedures used in
Bergson's comparisons of the United States and the USSR and then
at greater length on the economic significance of the comparisons.
Bergson's compilation of the existing data is complete. I do not
believe there is any way to improve the coverage of the comparisons
substantially unless the Russians publish more. Soviet economic data,
as most economists are aware, are fragmentary, poorly defined, mis-
leading, and on occasion simply untrustworthy. We are all indebted to
Bergson for having carried out the voluminous job of data checking
and testing and evaluating which was required in the construction of
these comparisons.
THE DATA
The comparability and representativeness of the product and price
sample leave much to be desired, as Bergson fully explains in his paper.
He points out that the quality of Soviet goods is frequently below
nominal standards because of a pervasive seller's market, and hence
are inferior to supposedly comparable U.S. goods. This low and van-186 Current International Comparisons
able quality of goods is worth emphasizing because of its direct bearing
on the bias in the comparison. In addition, it points up the problem
of interpretation arising from the absence of market-determined prices
in the USSR, which I will discuss below.
As regards representativeness 'the sample is limited to those prices
which the Russians have published. This' leaves Out not only the prices
of goods that the United States produces but the USSR does not, but
also those prices the Russians want to leave out. In the field of pro-
ducers' equipment, it also leaves out the nonserial production of ma-
chines, the so-called one-time orders. There is good reason to believe
that the ruble-dollar ratios for serially produced goods are lower, than
for custom-made goods or one-time orders. Furthermore, one-time
orders, according to recent Russian reports, include many serially pro-
duced goods modified only in trivial ways, and hence significantly
overpriced. I assume the incentive to mislabel and overprice machin-
ery operated in 1955 as well as in recent years. Then as now, enterprise
performance was measured and judged by an index of value of output.
The selective bias in the sample of machinery and equipment helps to
explain why the ruble-dollar ratio for investment equipment, and
military equipment, is so low.
The problem of diversity is one that is not explicitly discussed by
Bergson. The mix of products, both intermediate and final, is decided
in the USSR by enterprises and planners who are overwhelmingly con-
cerned with cost and physical quantities of production. The influence
of customers, excepting probably the armed forces, who are also con-
cerned with the utility of the products, is minimal. One important
aspect of mix is the diversity or variety of goods.
This problem is not simply the usual problem that poorer countries
have less diversity than richer countries. The Soviet menu of con-
sumers' goods and services is a short one, far shorter than its putative
per capita income would justify—as visitors to both the USSR and
Europe (East or West) testify. In poor countries where markets operate,
at least we can say that consumers have that diversity relative to quan-
tity that they are willing to pay for. In the USSR we know that quan-
tities are emphasized at the expense of variety not only because of
administrative necessity—the things left out are things the administra-USSR and U.S. Comparative National Income187
tivesystem finds hard to produce—but also because extension of variety
is always likely to reduce economies of scale somewhat.
This discussion of diversity refers to the effect of the reduced shop-
ping list on measurement. Because of it the dollar value of Soviet
product is overstated and the ruble price of U.S. product is under-
stated. This question must be separated from the questions of whether
the Soviet system could increase variety at final or intermediate levels
and whether by so doing it would raise or lower efficiency. The degree
to which an increase in the variety of final goods, as ordered by Gos-
plan, would increase consumer utility and, hence, offset the reduction
in quantity depends on the system's success in choosing the right vari-
eties. Likewise, the degree to which an increase in the variety of inter-
mediate goods at the expense of quantity would increase or decrease
the quantity of final goods depends on the efficiency of the system in
choosing and producing the right varieties. Speculation as to the effect
of such changes has no bearing on the measurement issue. The mea-
surement issue is that the variety of final goods is restricted in the Soviet
economy to a far greater extent than in market economies of com-
parable per capita incomes and this dimension of performance is not
reflected in the comparison of the United States and the USSR.
THE PROCEDURES
In dealing with miserly data doled out by.a noneconomizing system,
the investigator must adopt many compromises. Bergsôn's procedures
are as good as various possible alternatives, as far as the plausibility of
the results are concerned. However, a few statements about alternatives
may help to reveal the difficulties and uncertainties in such a com-
parison.
The first problem is measuring farm income in kind. The issue is
between measuring this kind of income at farm gate prices (average
realized prices of farm commodities) or at retail prices less transporta-
tion and distribution value added. In the ruble measure of Soviet
national income the question is whether one includes in the price of
commodities consumed in kind some value for imputed rent; the
average realized prices do not, but the retail prices would, since they
include the famous Soviet turnover tax. In the dollar valuation of
Soviet income in kind the question is how much home processing to188 Current International Comparisons
impute to peasants and how to value it. As Bergson himself suggests,
his use of farm gate prices probably underestimates the degree of
processing in the peasant consumption in kind. In any event, I agree
with Bergson that the use of ruble-dollar ratios for retail prices prob-
ably overstates the dollar value of Russian peasant consumption by
underestimating the distribution and transportation shares of food
prices in the United States.
Another problem is the question of illegal activities for private gain.
There is, according to rumor as well as the Soviet press, a great deal
of private service, of private processing of state materials, and also of
simple sale for private gain of stolen state goods. Bergson, wisely per-
haps, chose not to try to account for, these activities of unknown magni-
tude. Nevertheless, consumption, 1 suspect, is significantly understated
by the omission of these activities.
EVALUATION OF THE COMPARISONS
I subscribe to Bergson's summary appraisal that biases in the ruble-
dollar parities are mostly favorable to the ruble, that is, the ruble is
overvalued. Possibly, however, the understatement of farm income in
kind and the omission of some private activities may partially offset the
overvaluation in dollar prices. This is not intended as a comment on
direction 'of bias as much as it is on degree of uncertainty.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMPARISONS
Bergson's objective is a comparison of the production potential of the
two economies as opposed to a comparison of welfare. The com-
parison in dollars can be thought of as the relative capacity of the
two countries to produce the Soviet mix of output. The assumption is
that the United States could shift resources at initial relative prices
to produce an output mix proportional to the Soviet mix. The com-
parison in rubles assumes a shift of the Soviet economy to the U.S. mix.
This interpretation clearly depends heavily on market-determined
prices, and market processes for transferring resources between uses.
The near absence of market-determined prices and market processes in
the USSR casts a great deal of doubt on the usefulness and validity of
the interpretation. It is likely that the United States had the potential
in 1955 to shift reasonably well to the Soviet mix, except for naturalUSSR and U.S. Comparative National Income189
resourceconstraints, such as oil deposits. But these constraints can
normally be overcome by foreign trade. Presumably, this would be true
of any larger and technologically more advanced country in comparison
with a smaller one, and the smaller and poorer country would have less
of an ability to shift its output mix, for example, the United States
against Switzerland. However, by considering the alternatives pro-
vided by foreign trade, the problems of changing patterns of use could
be thought of as soluble even by a smaller economy.
The •Soviet economy,, in contrast, is quite different institutionally.
Not only is it far inside its technical production possibilities function,
but its processes for and efficiency in transferring resources contrasts
with those of market economies. Its inability to take full advantage of
foreign trade exemplifies an inherent difficulty in allocating resources
to their highest value uses. The problem is not in actually moving
labor or redirecting capital assets. Indeed, in 1955 the USSR was carry-
ing out a massive movement of labor and capital to plough up the
New Lands of Kazakhstan and West Siberia for wheat growing. How-
ever, the movement of resources is carried out by administrative direc-
tion and not by market forces, and the output results are frequently
disappointing. The resources are deployed not only for the end uses
desired'by the leaders but in the industry branches specified by them.
This is to say that the entrepreneurship is performed through sweeping
policies decided by a relatively few high-level leaders, and there is no
automatic trial and error process to clean up the wreckage in their
track. New Lands program was a success but Khrushchev's later
attempt to build a large, modern, chemical industry quickly was not.
Similarly, his plan for catching up with the United States in meat
production fellshort and was a massive waste of badly needed grain.
Examples could be multiplied to indicate that the leaders frequently
err and that, at best, they perceive only a few of the possible opportu-
nities. These institutional rigidities suggest a relatively low efficiency
in transferring resources.
There are two kinds of empirical evidence directly relating to the
mobility of resources in the USSR. Recent studies have shown that the
elasticity of substitution of. capital, for labor in the USSR is very low—
in the neighborhood of 0.2 or 0.3 against 0.5 in the United States.
Secondly, the time for completion of new investment projects, by which190 CurrentInternational Comparisons
most redirection of resources is accomplished, is much longer than in
Western market economies. These difficulties in transferring resources
bear on the significance of the comparison of the USSR and the United
States in ruble prices. I would think that the USSR would have great
difficulty in shifting toward the U.S. mix.
In order to shift to the U.S. mix the USSR must not only expand
quantities of some categories of goods and reduce others but it must
also radically expand the variety of models, styles, etc., to reach, let
us say, even the Italian level of diversity, let alone the U.S. one. Sec-
ondly, the expansion of many goods requires complementary services.
For example, the Russians are currently attempting an expansion of
passenger automobile production, from 300,000—400,000 a year to a
million a year, with. the help of the Fiat Company of Italy. I anticipate
they will succeed in two or three years, perhaps. However, it will be
much more difficult to achieve corresponding quantities of highways,
maintenance and repair service facilities, and spare parts. Seemingly,
chronic difficulties in providing retail, personal, and repair services
have hampered Soviet programs for housing, consumer durables, and
consumption in general for decades.
The Soviet economy is in a state of widespread disequilibrium in the
micro-allocation of resources. Indeed, one of the most important uses
of the comparison of the United States and the USSR is to support
that statement, as Bergson has shown.' In addition, however, no forces
seem to be working toward reduction of disequilibrium. This implies
either that the Soviet feasibility locus 2ismore convex than that of a
market economy or that its probable shape is much more uncertain.
The uncertainty is compounded by the observation that the slope of
the relative price plane along which shifting of output mix is assumed
to occur surely cannot be assumed to betangent to the feasibility locus.
The prices that are available are state- or enterprise-determined, and
not market prices equating supply and demand.
My intent is not to dwell on the inefficiency of the Soviet economy,
but to point out the consequences of its institutional arrangements for
1SeeA. Bergson, Economics of Soviet Planning, New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1964.
2Thisphrase, as used by Bergson, expresses the thought that the USSR's output
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the problems of measurement. The ruble measure of relative size
almost surely overstates the relative ability of the Soviet economy to•
produce the U.S. mix of output, significantly more, I suggest, than the
lira measure of comparative size of the United States and Italy,,which
Bergson presents, overstates the ability of the Italian economy.
A final problem is that production potential cannot be separated
from welfare or utility. Production must produce utilities or it is not
production. A major weakness of the Soviet economic system isits
relative inability to produce what customers want or need. The prob-
lem for an international comparison is not only the relation of Soviet
preference functions to Western or U.S. preference functions, but the
extent to which the USSR is producing in detail according to any
utility function, even one that might be said to express planners'
preferences. This is in part the quality problem which Bergson recog-
nizes, and which may result in a large overstatement of USSR produc-
tion, particularly of services. But, in addition, it is a problem of the
mix of production.
Consider the low price of producers' equipment relative to con-
sumer goods in the USSR as compared with the United States or Italy,
as cited by Bergson.3 If this were a meaningful comparison, one would
expect the USSR to be exporting machinery and equipment in sub-
stantial quantities. But on the contrary, the USSR in 1955 did not
export nearly as much machinery and equipment as it imported in
trade with the West, and still does not. Indeed, currently it is a large
net importer of machinery and equipment from Italy. The inability to
export those types of machines which seem to be relatively cheap is the
result of lack of durability, lack of repair services and spare parts, and
unresponsiveness to individual consumers' needs for special tailoring
or modification of equipment. The export market places a radically
different valuation on these goods than the internal pricing system.
In this sense, the comparison of the United States and the USSR in
dollar prices overstates the utility of the Soviet mix. Or to reverse the
statement, the dollar comparison understates the ability of the United
States to produce a mix equivalent to the Soviet mix in utility. The
dollar value of the Soviet output is obtained by pricing goods and
3See Table 13.192 CurrentInternational Comparisons
services at dollar prices of physically comparable U.S. goods (of venera-
ble vintage in some cases) or, in their absence, at cost. Many of these
goods would cost more to produce in the United States than better and
more up-to-date substitutes. In the case of innumerable types of ma-
chinery, it would cost more to produce the Soviet design in the United
States than a superior U.S. design. According to the dollar compari-
Sons the USSR has been producing more farm equipment than the
United States since at least 1955, and cumulatively, over the whole
period of fifteen years probably more than twice as much. Yet it is
hardly disputable that the United States currently gets a great deal
more agricultural work done per year by machines than the USSR.4
It is clear that the United States could have generated a stock of farm
equipment capable of carrying Out the volume of machine processes
actually achieved in the USSR over the last fifteen years with a much
smaller annual expenditure on equipment and spare parts. The U.S.
machinery would be of a different design and mix, more productive,
more durable, easier to repair, more efficiently used, etc. It need not be
mentioned that the corresponding U.S. requirement for labor to pro-
duce the Soviet output would still have been drastically smaller than in
the USSR.
The import of these arguments (granting my allegations of fact) for
the meaning of the comparison of a central administered bureaucratic
production system with a market system is something like this. Produc-
tion potential in a market environment implies a potential contingent
only on 'a change in demand. The ability of the productive organiza-
tions to carry out the shift is not essentially questioned. However, the
ability of, the Soviet economy to shift investment goods or defense
equipment and research and development to production in the style
and diversity of U.S. consumer goods, i.e., to the production of meat,
of vegetables and fruit, of single-family dwelling units, etc., at estab-
4Thecumulative value of farm equipment in the USSR for 1955—68 inclusive in
1955 rublesis15,500 million rubles. This excludes spare parts (see Narodnoe
khoziaistvo SSSR for various years). Converted at Bergson's dollar-ruble ratio of 2.63,
the value in 1955 dollars is $41 billion. U.S. production of agricultural equipment
in current prices for 1955—68 is about $23.5 billion. (See Bureau of the Census,
Annual Survey of Manufactures, for 1955—66; 1967 and 1968 extrapolated by the
Federal Reserve Board index of farm equipment.) This statistic includes spare
parts. Deflated to 1955 dollars, the U.S. total would be less than half the USSR
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lishedprices is questionable under present management institutions.
The meaning of the comparisons is uncertain in the sense that the
interpretation of the comparative ability to produce alternative mixes
is contingent on some unspecifiable kind and degree of managerial
reorganization in the USSR. Perhaps the meaning of these compari-
Sons should be construed very literally. The dollar value of Soviet GNP
is what it would cost to produce the Soviet mix in-the United States
(but not what the U.S. market would be willing to pay for it). The
ruble valuation of the U.S. product is the cost of producing under
Soviet conditions a product the composition of which is restricted' to
goods produced in the USSR.
ZOLTAN KENESSEY, United Nations Statistical Office
INTRODUCTION
The introduction to Bergson's paper—stating that the comparison of
the real national incomes of the Soviet Union and of the United States
in the West "began to be considered primarily in the appraisal of
Soviet military potential"—reminds one of the beginnings of national
income (and wealth) estimations and comparisons approximately
three hundred years ago.
In fact the emergence of the first national income concepts (and
more generally that of the science of Statistics ifl the form of political
arithmetic) is closely interwoven with rather similar needs for inter-
national comparisons at that time. Sir William Petty, when he con-
structed the first national income estimates in 1665 and 1676 for
England, at the same time tried to compare the income and resources
of England with those of France and the Netherlands. Not unlike
researchers three centuries later (sitting in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
or in Moscow) he was not entirely able to repeat, for the other two
countries in which he became interested, the more detailed estimates
he had prepared for his own country. So for France and the Nether-
NOTE: Responsibility for the views expressed here is entirely mine. Neither the
United Nations, with which I am currently affiliated, nor the Hungarian Central
Statistical Office, where I formerly served, are in any way accountable for the
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lands his evaluation was based on population figures and on his
estimates of productivity in various occupational groups in the two
countries. On the basis of his findings, he derived ten "Principal Con-
clusions," three of which were: 1
That France cannot, by reason of Natural and Perpetual Impediments, be
more powerful at Sea, than the English or Hollanders
That the People, and Territories of the King of England, are Naturally near
as considerable, for Wealth, and Strength, as those of France
That the King of England's Subjects, have the Stock competent, and con-
venient to drive the Trade of the whole Commercial World.
In history books it is also mentioned that because of their delicate
nature and to avoid diplomatic complications with France, the calcu-
lations of Petty were published with the permission of the king only
after Petty's death, in 1690 and 1691.2
The second set of national income estimates for England, prepared
by Gregory King first for the year 1688 and then for 1695, were also
accompanied by numerical estimates for France and Holland. King
estimated the national income of all three countries in pounds sterling,
but again (and quite naturally) his estimates for England were much
more detailed than those for the other two countries.
This detour into the times of Petty and King may remind us about
the seldom mentioned impact of war and military rivalries on our
science. Most people are aware of the important impact of such rival-
ries on the development of surgery or nuclear physics. However, in the
field of economics and statistics not only the general public, but quite
a few professionals are unaware of some important influences of a
similar nature.3 It would not serve much purpose to lament about this
state of affairs (apparently quite unchanged over the last three cen-
turies) but still it is hard to rejoice unreservedly about some otherwise
1 William Petty, Economic Writings, ed. C. H. Hull, Cambridge, Erigi., 1899, vol.
1, pp. 247—48.
2 Naturally this fact ought to be of only historical interest in our enlightened
times, when the kings of England and the czars of Russia have long ceased to rule
over what is today the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics.
For example, the larger-scale application of national accounting (and indeed
the organization of the Central Statistical Office in the United Kingdom) is not too
widely recognized in its relationship to the war efforts of Britain during the crucial
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impressivegains made in economics and statistics on such a basis.
Economists and statisticians probably do not share the feelings of grave
responsibility expressed by many nuclear scientists for the results of
their professional activities. Despite the material differences between
nuclear physics and economics and statistics, in the light of the appar-
ent historical trends, complacency is probably not the best attitude for
our profession either.
It should be noted that Bergson is placed in the good company of Sir
William Petty and Gregory King, the truly great forebears of our
science, because his work follows the same traditon and because he has
had to face the same kinds of unique problems during his investiga-
tions. It is hoped that since he has been placed in that company, and
the respect due him for his great efforts has been expressed, he will not
feel aggrieved if one turns now to dwell on various aspects of these
unique problems.
CONCERNING THE OVERALL RESULTS OF THE COMPARISON
Probably a natural first reaction to the very interesting investigation
produced by Bergson is to look at its overall numerical results, i.e., to
the relationships estimated for the national income of the USSR vis-à-
vis the United States. According to Table 14 of his study, the 1965
GNP of the USSR valued in rubles is estimated as 35 per cent of that
of the United States, and in dollars as 57.5 per cent of the GNP of the
United States. One way to look at these figures is to compare them
with estimates of a similar nature published in the Soviet As
it is shown below in terms of dollar valuation a tentative attempt can
be made at such a comparison with the use of the data published in the
latest issue of the Soviet statistical yearbook.
According to the latest official estimates of the Central Statistical Ad-
ministration of the USSR the national income of the Soviet Union in
1968 was 243.1 billion At the official exchange rate the dollar
equivalent of this sum is given as $270.1 billion.6
L. I. Nesterov and Y. N. Ivanov (both from the Statistical Office of the United
Nations) made available quite a few new Soviet publications in the area of USSR-
U.S. comparisons for the preparation of the present comments, for which sincere
thanks is expressed here.
Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1968 godu, USSR Central Statistical Administration,
Moscow, 1969, p. 569.
6 Ibid., p. 146.196 CurrentInternational Comparisons
In that same table the dollar value of the Soviet national income is
also given with a correction for the differences between the price levels
of the USSR and the United States. From the context of the table it
can be inferred that the national income Of the USSR—which is esti-
mated to be $326.4 billion given at U.S. prices. In order to achieve
conceptual comparability the national income of the United States is
given by the yearbook according to the methodology applied by the
Central Statistical Administration. The estimate for the U.S. national
income in 1968 is $513.2 billiofl.8
Thus using the methodology applied by the Central Statistical Ad-
ministration, and dollar rather than ruble valuation, the national
income of the USSR in 1968 was 62.8 per cent of that of the United
States in the same year.
It is somewhat interesting to compare this with the extrapolation
of results from other sources, using the statistical indexes of the growth
of the national income of the Soviet Union and the United States as
published in the same issue of the yearbook.
As mentioned above, in the present study by Bergson, the 1965 GNP
(not national income, which was compared above) of the USSR valued
in dollars is given as 57.5 per cent of the U.S. value. (See Bergson's
Table 14.) In the Soviet statistical yearbook (page 144) the 1968 level
of the USSR's national income is 26 per cent higher and that of the
United States is 15 per cent higher than in 1965.
Using for extrapolation these figures (which relate to the growth of
the national income as opposed to that of the GNP) in combination
with the 1965 percentage established by Bergson for the USSR com-
pared to the United States (in dollar values and adhering to the GNP
concept) yields 63 per cent for the USSR for 1968—a remarkably close
figure to that published on the base of the Soviet national accounting
methodology with the adoption of U.S. prices for the valuation of the
Soviet national income.
While the data included in the yearbook do not extend to com-
parisons in ruble valuations for the two countries involved, it can be
noted that in the above-mentioned estimate for 1968, 243.1 billion
7Loc. cit.
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rublesare equated with $326.4 billion, implying the equivalence (in
the given context) of 134 U.S. cents with 100 kopecks.
Admittedly the extrapolation of the Bergson results for 1965 to
1968 with other indicators (i.e., with those related to GNP rather than
to the national income in the materials product system sense) would
produce results only somewhat different. Even in terms of a GNP-
oriented comparison it would appear permissible, for a crude extrap-
olation for the short period involved, to disregard whatever distor-
tions arise because of the assumption that the service sector grew at the
same rate as that observed for the other GNP components.
At any rate the rather marked closeness of the two dollar-valuation
estimates can be interpreted either from a more formal and critical or
from a rather broad standpoint.
The relative closeness of the results obtained by researchers on
either side of the Atlantic is gratifying to me. Apparently this is a
broad view of the problem, based on the assumption that even within
a single country the national income and product estimates performed
by the agencies having access to a very wide range of data are subject
to variations and/or errors. It is conceivable that two competent and
independent teams of statisticians within a single country, having
access to the same basic data and following the same broad accounting
principles, could come out with somewhat different results for the
GNP (or national income) of their country in any given year. Inter-
national comparisons are even more subject to limitations, especially
if they are performed in a noncollaborative manner, as here. Con-
sequently, while the formal accuracy of one or the other of the two
estimates may be questioned, the closeness of the two numerical re-
suits should be interpreted as a very reassuring fact about the order of
magnitude of the levels of the two countries.
Adherents of a more formal standpoint (whom I do not wish to
join) would probably base their dislike of the quoted results on the
following logic: The Soviet estimate adheres to an MPS (materials
product system) concept for both countries. The Bergson study is
based on a GNP-related concept. The differences in the share of serv-
ices within all economic activities in the United States and the USSR
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Bergson must be off the mark. (A real skeptic among them would
probably add: It is possible that both of them are.)
It is not my task to defend either Professor Bergson or the Soviet
estimators against any of these "rigorous" critics. In the final analysis,
in fact, only a very thorough study of all the details of the two esti-
mates (amounting to a repetition of the calculations, which I certainly
cannot do) could justify definitively the broad standpoint advocated
in the present notes. However one—admittedly not decisive—argument
against the formal attitude may deserve mention.
The adoption of the logic cited above and a strict argument in
favor of either of the two results may lead to strange assumptions, such
as the following: Bergson is perhaps overstating and/or the Soviet
Statistical Yearbook is perhaps understating the dollar value of the
Soviet GNP (or Soviet national income) since a priori the relationship
between the two countries should show a higher percentage for the
Soviet Union on an MPS basis than on a GNP basis.
If the results of the two estimates are as close as in this case, someone
stressing the sole reliability of the result of the Bergson estimate may
find that he has to agree to a higher MPS ratio in favor of the Soviet
Union than that published in the USSR. Again, someone accepting
absolute validity for the Soviet estimate may agree that, a priori, a
GNP ratio between the two countries ought to be smaller than that
estimated for the USSR vis-à-vis the United States on the MPS basis.
According to such reasoning, an accompanying and consistent U.N.
national accounts system estimate for the published Soviet calcula-
tions may lead to a "lower" result for Soviet GNP than that produced
by Bergson (hence the assumption of the implicit "overstatement" by
Bergson in favor of the Soviet Union). On the other hand an accom-
panying and consistent MPS estimate for the Bergson study may pro-
duce a "higher" result for Soviet national income than that produced
by the Soviet statisticians (hence the assumption of the implicit "un-
derstatement" in the Soviet Statistical Yearbook).
To avoid any misunderstanding I wish to underline that I do not
share the reasoning outlined above or the implicit assumptions men-
tioned. In fact I firmly believe that in the given context the broader
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possiblystrange implications—is both more appropriate and more con-
structive.
Itis interesting to note that recent estimates developed by the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (based largely on
the short-cut method of F. Janossy and published in the Economic
Survey of Europe in 1969) are rather closely in the middle range of the
two limits produced by Bergson for the USSR-U.S. comparison. (Some
remarks on the ECE work are contained in the appendix to this
comment.)
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
In commenting on a few methodological problems, it is desirable to
state the significance of the objective of Professor Bergson's paper as
the study of the "comparative 'production potential' "ratherthan
the investigation of the quite important but more elusive welfare con-
cept.
If one thinks of the various possible uses of the results of real product
comparisons (as mentioned below) it is clear that the choice made by
Bergson in this respect is not only the more practical one but also
the one which suits the majority of the final purposes listed here for
the use of international comparison results: 10
Assessmentsof welfare levels (standard of living, real incomes, etc.,
compared in different countries)
Studies of economic efficiency
Comparisons of economic and military power
Agreements concerning cost-sharing between nations (in the budgets
of international organizations, common defense arrangements, etc.)
Formulation of foreign aid policies (taking into account the capabil-
ities of the donors and the needs, the level of economic develop-
ment, etc., of the recipients)
Economic policy or planning (the comparative data serving as informa-
tion or even as a set of development targets)
9Seefirst paragraph of his paper, above.
10See"Plans for International Product and Purchasing Power Comparison"
(mimeo), U.N. Statistical Office and University of Pennsylvania International Corn.
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Analysis of foreign markets (the purchasing power of markets abroad,
price competitiveness of different countries, etc.)
Integration processes (judging the possibilities and impact of specializa-
tion, cooperation, common markets, the movements of the factors
of production, etc.)
Construction and verification of economic theories (models of growth,
etc.)
Statistical purposes (to obtain weights for regional or world indexes
etc.)
One would think however that if the basic data permit it, a more
explicit decomposition of the underlying factors leading to the differ-
ences observed in the comparison of the "productive potential" of the
two countries studied would be of great interest.
Admittedly no way can be found for any "complete separation" of
the influence of prices on quantity comparisons or vice versa. Still if
the necessary basic information is available the performance and the
showing of the more detailed results for such comparisons in the
following form" is of some help:
Quantity comparison with the price weights of the base country:
Q0P0
Quantity comparison with the price weights of the other country:
Price comparison with the quantity weights of the base country:
EP1
Price comparison with the quantity weights of the other country:
Especially for the analysis of production potential a somewhat more
direct investigation of the influence of the quantity and price measures
(and weights) on the results obtained can be. of great interest. For
"Milton Gilbert and Irving B. Kravis, An International Comparison of National
Products and the Purchasing Power of Currencies, Paris, Organization for European
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examplethe interpretation (in the context mentioned above) of the
statement of Bergson that it was his aim "to use price ratios with
Soviet weights to deflate ruble outlays and ratios with U.S. weights to
deflate dollar outlays" 12presentssome difficulty for the reader. Gen-
erally, it appears appropriate to underline here that for studies of this
nature the significance of the "quantity approach" is somewhat greater
than that of the "price 13
Themethodological problems related to the price observations are
also quite complex.14 On the one hand it would be quite unfair to
dwell upon the nature and possible deficiencies of the basic price
information, available to Bergson for his study. His control over any
deficiencies of this sort was obviously limited. Still the uneasiness one
feels about some problems of the basic data is hard to eliminate.
Obviously, this is no comment on the quality of the very detailed
investigation done by Bergson. However, even the most excellent
compilation and evaluation of basic data (in this case, price observa-
tions) may not eliminate such uneasiness in the reader, especially as to
the problems of matching identical or comparable products for pricing.
Clearly there is no need to idealize price data collection by any
government statistical organization. If one reads the report of the
Stigler Committee 15orother relevant materials, the situation in this
respect would not appear ideal in many ways. Still the same docu-
ments also give a much better feeling for the complex efforts under-
taken to improve price data collection. It appears enough to refer to
the study of sampling problems for the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Consumer Price Index 16asopposed to the much more unexplored
question of the representativeness of Sears, Roebuck prices." The
12Seelast paragraph of The Calculations, in his paper.
13Especiallybecause of the problems related to the system of relative prices in
the USSR, extensively investigated in Bergson's The Real National Income of Soviet
Russia since 1928, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1961.
14Becauseof the relative lack of emphasis on quantity observations in the paper
it would not appear useful to dwell here on problems related to the quantity
approach.
15Reportof Price Statistics Review Committee, The Price Statistics of the Federal
Government, New York, NBER, 1961.
16TheConsumer Price Index: History and Techniques, BLS Bull. 1517, 1966.
17Oneshould not be too much surprised if the estimators of the dollar values
of the USSR national income in the Central Statistical Administration in Moscow
also had a Sears, Roebuck catalogue on their shelves.202 CurrentInternational Comparisons
sample of prices used for the USSR in the study quite possibly has its
limitations as well.
Under the given conditions there is apparently no remedy for these
problems. Noncollaborative comparisons—as it can be demonstrated
from Petty and King to Bergson and the Soviet yearbook—by their
nature have these kinds of limitations. The only possibility of over-
coming this obstacle lies in the bilateral, cooperative approach to such
studies advocated below.
CONCLUSIONS
On the preceding pages due respect was paid to Professor Bergson for
undertaking this very complex and very demanding study. Taking into
account all the difficulties such studies have to face, his investigation
is certainly quite impressive. The closeness of the overall ratio obtained
for the USSR vis-à-vis the United States in dollar values is also very
interesting.
Naturally there remain numerous methodological, political, nu-
merical, and other points on which disagreement could be aired. But
in view of the overall significance of such studies, and in order to
stimulate the thinking about the possibilities for overcoming the in-
herent limitations of all investigations conducted in a noncollaborative
manner, the more constructive approach of discussing the questions of
collaborative comparisons is attempted.
The road to bilateral cooperative arrangements for studies aimed
at USSR-U.S. comparisons is obviously not an easy one. The results of
such comparisons are obviously not only of an academic interest.
Fully recognizing all the difficulties involved in the arrangement of
a cooperative study it still does not appear superfluous to list some of
the comparative advantage of the cooperative approach over even the
best organized and most ingenious unilateral work in this area.
Apparently, only with the cooperation of the national statistical
services of these two great countries would it be possible to base the
comparisons on the most reliable primary data for quantities, prices,
and expenditures. Anyone familiar with the intricacies of national ac-
counts estimates must admit that without access to the great variety
of data available within the statistical services and in other govern-USSR and U.S. Comparative National Income203
mentaland nongovernmental organizations, the reliability of estimates
must suffer considerably.
In the case of quantity and price data, the direct help and involve-
ment of national statistical services, at least in two important aspects,
it is quite indispensable. On the one hand, without such assistance it
is extremely difficultto assess the representativeness of the items
included in the sample in relation to the vast total population of goods
to be compared. It is quite possible that the quantity or price informa-
tion somehow available to private research is not unreliable per Se.
However, another matter is whether the information available is well
enough chosen for inferences to be drawn from it with respect to the
total population of goods. The best possible sampling frame is cer-
tainly available only to national statistical services.
Another important aspect of the involvement of the statistical serv-
ices (and through them of other national authorities) in the procure-
ment of price and quantity data is related to the possibilities of achiev-
ing a much higher degree of comparability (and/or quality adjust-
ments) for the products and services studied. Anyone with experience
in this area can testify about the formidable difficulties encountered
here—even when such help is made available. Without such help the
task is really overwhelming.
It should also be mentioned that in choosing the most effective
general methodology it is advantageous to have the cooperation of
the national statistical services. While quite a few methodological
procedures may look impeccable in theory, only with the cooperation
of the two sides involved in such an undertaking is it possible to judge
their effectiveness within the statistical-economic context of the two
economies being compared. This is not to say that success is secured
only with complete unanimity as to the best methodology for a com-
parison. Nevertheless, the discussion of the methods—even if complete
agreement cannot be reached—may be of enormous help in selecting
the best path for the solution of the innumerable problems which
have to be faced.
Other remarks on the advantages of a cooperative' approach could
be made. However, this is hardly needed since most of the arguments
are rather self-evident. It can be safely assumed that the vast majority
of researchers would agree to such an assessment. Probably the more204 CurrentInternational Comparisons
experienced they are in "unilateral" work in this area—like Bergson—
the more they could say about the possible advantages of a cooperative
approach.
The real difficulty, they would say, is not in their doubts about the
advantages of the cooperative approach but in its feasibility. Naturally,
on this crucial point they may be right. On the other hand, perhaps
not enough has been done to explore the possibilities in this area.
Possibly, direct cooperation for such a study may be too difficult to
organize. Perhaps the exploration of proper arrangements for indirect
cooperation, possibly with the help of an international organization,
would yield somewhat better results.
At least one remark should be made about the latter approach. An
international organization could, with the help of the national statisti-
cal services, certainly go further than private researchers—and still
work on its own responsibility, i.e., without necessarily implying re-
sponsibility by the countries for the results so achieved.
At the same time an international organization could prove to be a
place where ideas concerning the optimal ways to achieve comparabil-
ity could be best exchanged and where the interpretation of the results
could be safeguarded against unilateral or extreme views or against
propagandistic use.
It is hoped that the widespread efforts for such comparisons by
many researchers in the two largest producers of the present-day world
economy will not remain unrewarded in the future. There can be
little doubt that even a measure of cooperation in this field would
materially improve the depth of such investigations.
One could argue that much of the above is not directly related to
the impressive work of Bergson in this area. It is contended, however,
that his stimulating paper should encourage everyone interested in
research in this field to explore every possibility for improvement in
this important realm of economic studies which had its beginnings in
efforts of men like Sir William Petty and Gregory King.
APPENDIX
The significance of extensive direct cooperation of the national statis-
tical services of the countries studied in international comparisons does
not decrease even if such work is carried out by international orga.niza-USSR and U.S. Comparative National Income205
tions(which usually have better contacts with their member countries
and whose multinational staff has better access to sources of data and
a rather wide knowledge on methodological differences, etc.).
The comparisons recently performed by the U.N. Economic Com-
mission for Europe can be mentioned in this respect. For the Economic
Survey of Europe in 1969 a rather detailed study was prepared with
the aid of certain short-cut methods, based on physical or "nonmone-
tary" indicators of output and/or consumption, using regression tech-
niques. The approach adopted for the study largely followed the
method as developed earlier in Hungary by F. Jánossy.18 This work is
a quite interesting and certainly worthwhile attempt at finding a less
expensive type of method than that followed by those who delve into
the difficulties of making detailed price and quantity comparisons.
Nevertheless, the interpretation and acceptance of the results is not
without difficulties.
According to the calculations, the 1965 per capita gross domestic
product of the USSR was about 40.5 per cent of that of the United
States.19 These estimates fit comfortably within the two limits given
by Bergson for the per capita GNP relationship of the two countries
in the same year (29.5 per cent in ruble values and 48.5 per cent in
dollar values).20 Naturally the same can be said about total GDP
(about 48 per cent on the base of the ECE calculations), which is also
neatly within the range of the estimates given by Bergson—35 per cent
and 57.5 per cent.21
Considering the different methodology applied by Bergson and the
ECE, the closeness of the results is quite remarkable. One is tempted
to conclude (as in the case of the comparison of the Bergson figures
with those of the Soviet Statistical Yearbook in dollar values) that
broadly speaking the results confirm each other.
While this may be the best conclusion to be drawn, a few problems
nevertheless remain. Although the overall results of these three esti-
mates are rather close to each other, in certain respects the discrepan-
cies are quite pronounced. In the case of Bergson's estimates compared
18F.Janossy: A gazdasdgi fejlettsdg mdrhetösdge ds uj mdrdsi mddszere, Budapest,
KOzgazdathgi Kiadó, 196S.
Seetable at end of this appendix.
20SeeBergson's Table 14.
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to those in the Soviet yearbook, for example, the comparisons of the
output originating in industry and agriculture are rather different.
Compared with the ECE estimates for consumption (USSR per capita
total consumption is given as about 32 per cent of the United States in
1965) the two limits given by Bergson are 20.6 and 34 per cent (in ruble
and dollar values) and the assumed differences in the scope of con-
sumption would not appear to explain completely the closeness of
the ECE estimate to the higher (dollar-valuation) figure given by
Bergson.
Other problems could be mentioned as well. On a priori grounds it
would appear doubtful whether the figures computed by the ECE for
Hungary and the USSR are good approximations for the comparison
of these two countries (for 1965 the per capita GDP is given as $1,015
for Hungary and $1,053 for the USSR). Most Western estimates
assume a somewhat larger difference in favor of the USSR as do the
calculations performed within the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (the latter being based on a different concept). On the oth.er
hand Bulgaria fares somewhat "worse," according to the ECE study in
per capita GDP (compared to the USSR) than according to the CMEA
comparisons (performed on an MPS basis).
Considering the great interest, and much better analytical possibil-
ities, in the more detailed results of such comparisons, the closeness of
the overall estimates does not seem to give sufficient assurance about
the divergencies seen in certain aspects.
One interesting feature of the ECE study is the publication of the
standard errors of the estimates. In the case of the USSR the "con-
fidence limits" at a 5 per cent significance level (as a percentage of
the average estimate) are given as ±24 per cent. For the United States
the same limits are ±10 per cent and for Hungary, ±15 per cent. This
attempt at judging the reliability of the figures published is certainly
most welcome. Nevertheless, if one takes them seriously, the differences
observed by the ECE for the Hungary-USSR comparison cannot be
taken as having material significance.
All in all the foregoing remarks mean to illuminate only one point,
namely, that the work performed by international organizations is
likely to have a marked advantage over unilateral efforts only in those
cases where (and to the extent that) the direct and extensive coopera-
tion of the countries studied can be obtained.USSR and U.S. Comparative National Income207






1965 Estimates inError ofper cent of
Exchange"Average"Estimate average
Rate Prices (dollars) Uestimates)
(2
Austria $1,273 $1,459 $ 57 ±8
Belgium-Luxembourg 1,782 1,886 74 ±8
Denmark 2,132 1,820 76 ±9
Finland 1,750 1,585 87 ±11
France 1,922 1,616 58 ±8
Greece 677 758 68 ±18
Ireland 943 1,239 66 ± Ii
Italy 1,021 1,190 50 ±9
Netherlands 1,537 1,796 64 ±7
Norway 1,910 1,668 58 ±7
Portugal 405 733 57 ±16
Spain 680 939 55 ±12
Sweden 2,536 2,171 86 ±8
Switzerland 2,274 1,863 105 ±1.2
Turkey 284 333 25 ±16
United Kingdom 1,802 1,929 73 ±8
West Germany 1,913 1,854 64 ±7
Japan 868 1,293 92 ±15
Canada 2,500 2,218 90 ±9
United States 3,553 2,597 126 ±10
Australia 2,057 1,889 71 ±8
New Zealand 1,999 1,850 107 ±12
Bulgaria — 877 87 ±2.1
Czechoslovakia 1,427 110 ±16
East Germany 1,437 92 ±13
Hungary — 1,015 73 ±15
Poland — 989 93 ±20
Romania 697 63 ±19
Soviet Union 1,053 121 ±24
Yugoslavia 692 55 ± I 7
SOURCE: U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe in 1969,
Part I, Chap. 4, App. Table V.
UBasedon the assumption of randomness of the sample; see text.208 CurrentInternational Comparisons
DAN USHER, Queen's University
National income is a summary statistic, one number to describe the
size of a compicte economy or to compare the sizes of two economies.
Bergson presents the number and explains how he got it, what sources
of data were used, and how the data were combined. There is, how-
ever, a sense in which the number is not fully explained. Users of
income comparisons—politicians, economists, and interested laymen—
would find the summary statistic more informative if they were told
precisely what it is that is being summarized. When one reads that
Russian household consumption per head is between 17 per cent and
22 per of American household consumption per head, one finds
oneself asking "What do the Russians eat?" and "How are they
housed?" and "How extensive are their medical services?" One would
like to know precisely what goods and services Americans have that
do not. The information might be presented in a long
table comparing American and Russian incomes quantity by quantity
and price by price in as much detail as the data allow, with footnotes
specifying assumptions made in identifying Russian and American
quantities and in choosing prices. Perhaps one can get this information
from the primary sources Bergson cites, but the amount of detective
work required would be considerable, for the construction of the Rus-
sian accounts seems to be a vast joint effort of many scholars continu-
ally cribbing from one another and developing layer upon layer of
estimates. It would be helpful if Bergson could cut through all this
and take us back to prices and quantities per head.
In introducing the study, Bergson says that income comparisons may
have two objectives: "appraisal of comparative 'production potential'
or appraisal of comparative 'welfare.' I take as a desideratum here the
appraisal of comparative production potential." This objective leads
Bergson to compare ratios of income at adjusted rubles (suitable for
production comparison) as well as at prevailing rubles (suitable for
welfare comparison). I would like to make a few remarks on relations
between welfare and production comparisons and on the extent to
which they may be distinguished. I will not discuss complications thatUSSR and U.S. Comparative National Income209
arisefrom the existence of international trade, nor will I discuss the
comparison of income classified by industry. I shall concentrate on
comparison of final goods and services in closed economies.
In Table 2 of Bergson's paper, we see that the ratio of Russian to
American income is 38.1 per cent at American prices, 22.1 per cent at
prevailing rubles, and 23.2 per cent at adjusted rubles. Let us think
of America as the base year and of Russia as the current year so that
the first of these numbers is the Laspeyres index and the latter two are
variants of the Paasche index. To say that one intends an income
comparison to reflect "welfare" or "production potential" is to say that
one has certain questions in mind which one hopes to answer by means
of the data. Two questions might reasonably be asked about produc-
tion.1 First, what fraction of the American output could Russia produce
if Russia chose a basket of goods and services in the same proportions
as goods and services in the American basket? Second, what fraction
or multiple of the Russian output could America produce if America
chose a basket of goods and services in the same proportions as goods
and services in the Russian basket? I shall refer to the answer to the
first question as the true production comparison at the American mix
of goods and services, and to the answer to the second question as the
true production comparison at the Russian mix of goods and services.
The two true ratios of Russian production potential to American pro-
duction potential will be designated TPA
Similarly, there are two welfare questions: First, what multiple of
the typical Russian income would one need in Russia to be as well off
as the typical American? Second, what multiple of the typical American
income would one need in America to be as well off as the typical
Russian? I shall refer to the answer to the first question as the com-
parison by American standards and to the answer to the second ques-
tion as the comparison by Russian standards. The two ratios of income
answering these questions will be designated TWA and TWR.
Relations among the true welfare comparisons, the true comparisons
of production potential, and the observed Paasche and Laspeyres
indexes are illustrated in Figure 1. Russia has a comparative advantage
1.SeeA. Bergson, The Real Income of Soviet Russia since 1928, Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 1961, Part 1; and R. Moorstein, "On Measuring Productive Poten.





NOTE: In Figure la, TPA =Ri/A;
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inmachines and America has a comparative advantage in grain, but
as the curves are drawn America can produce more grain and more
machines than Russia at any mix of output. The American output is
designated A and the Russian output is designated R. The heavy
curved lines through A and R are American and Russian production
possibility curves, and the curved dashed lines are indifference curves.
Tastes are the same in both countries in the sense that the countries
have one set of indifference curves in common. The relative prices of
grain in America and Russia are slopes of the "budget constraints"
AA2 and RR2.
As illustrated in Figure la, the Paasche and Laspeyres indexes of
output are P =R2/Aand L =R/A2,and the true productivity indexes
are TPA =R1/Aand TPR =R/A1.Figure lb is the same as Figure la
wherever the points are labeled identically. The point A3 is a projec-
tion onto the line from A to the origin of the tangent to the American
indifference curve at Russian prices. Thus R2/A3 isthe ratio of
Russian income to the income in rubles needed to make a Russian as
well off as an American. The true welfare comparisons at American
standards and at Russian standards are: TWA and T1.VR =
R2/A3.From Figure 1 it may be seen that two sets of inequalities must
always hold: TPA <P < TIVR and TTVA <L < TPR. These inequalities
are true as long as the indifference curves are convex, the production
possibility curves are concave, and the indifference curves are tangent
to production possibility curves at the chosen mix of output.
The reason for developing these inequalities here is to deal with
the question of whether and under what circumstances the Paasche and
Laspeyres indexes are upper and lower limits to the true indexes
we are searching for.It follows directly from the inequalities that
when the Paasche index exceeds the Laspeyres index the two indexes
may bracket the two true indexes of production potential but cannot
under any circumstances bracket the welfare indexes. Similarly, when
the Laspeyres index exceeds the Paasche index, the two indexes may
(and probably do) bracket the two true welfare indexes, but the true
indexes of production potential lie outside the range of the Paasche
and Laspeyres indexes.
Bergson's data furnish an example of the latter case. Since the
Laspeyres index (38.1 per cent) exceeds the Paasche index (22.1 per212 Current International Comparisons
cent),it follows that TPA <P <L < TPR. (The middle inequality
is an empirical fact; the other two inequalities are a logical conse-
quence of the concavity of production possibility curves.) In a sense,
the observable indexes of comparative real income are the wrong limits
to the numbers Bergson is searching for. Should the Americans try to
produce a basket of goods and services in proportion to the Russian
basket, they could produce something less than 2.3 times the Russian
income (2.3 =1/0.38).But nothing in the statistics indicates how
much less. There is no lower limit at all, and for all we know the
true figure might be less than 1. Similarly the Russians, if they tried
to produce a mix of outputs proportional to the American mix, would
produce something less than 22 per cent of the American output, but
again there is no lower limit. That, unfortunately, is all that can be
inferred from the data.
Difficulties arising from the absence of outer limits in comparisons
of production potential are compounded by problems encountered in
choosing commodities to be compared. The diagrams have been drawn
as though the division of output into a finite number of commodities
were God-given. In fact, we choose the commodities, and the result of
the comparison is influenced by our choice. Suppose that Russia and
America grow different varieties of wheat. Before a comparison of
income can begin, someone must draw equivalences between Russian
and American wheat by weight, by calorie content, by protein content,
by world prices, or whatever. And prior to this decision someone must
decide that Russian and American wheat are one and the same com-
modity for the purpose of income comparison. For the sake of the
argument, suppose that differences of soil and climate in Russia and
America are so great that Russian wheat will not grow in America
and American wheat will not grow in Russia. I think we would still
classify Russian and American wheat as the same commodity but our
reason for doing so would be that they are nearly perfect substitutes
in use despite the fact that there is no substitution between them in
production. In these circumstances our ideal of an income comparison
reflecting pure "production potential" becomes completely unattain-
able. Either we must say that America simply cannot produce the
Russian mix of goods and vice versa, or we must deal in comparisonsUSSR and U.S. Comparative National Income213
whereconsiderations of welfare have been brought to bear in organiz-
ing statistics at a lower level. Bergson has chosen the latter course, and
I think it is the right one, but in interpreting his data as measures of
production potential we must recognize that either he or someone else
who prepared the primary data has had to introduce considerations of
utility, welfare, and taste to work the primary data into a form
amenable to income comparison.
The issue of the existence of upper and lower limits to the true
ratios of welfare and production potential may be clarified by reinter-
preting the relation between the Paasche and Laspeyres indexes, and
by considering three simple cases of the situation described in Figure
1. It is a fact that
and
1
whereis the value of the output of the ith commodity in the base
year, isthe change in the price of the ith commodity between the
base year and the current year as a multiple of the average change in
prices, andis the change in the quantity between the base year and
the current year as a multiple of the average change in quantities.
Thus to say the L > P isto say that the andqj tend to be
negatively correlated or that the economy is moving along demand
curves between the base year and the current year. To say that P > L
is to say that the andare positively correlated and that the
economy is moving along supply curves between the base year and the
current year.
The three paradigm cases are the "taste case" illustrated in Figure
2a, the "technology case" illustrated in Figure 2b, and the "tax case"
illustrated in Figure 2c. The top half of each figure is a simplification
of Figure 1, and the bottom half conveys the same information as the
top half in the language of demand and supply curves.
In the taste case, indifference curves are homotbetic, that is to say,
every indifference curve is a scaled up or scaled down version of every
other curve, price ratios depend only on proportions of grain and
machines consumed, and all income elasticities equal 1. In interpreting












C' =outputof grain as a percentage of the output at A divided by output
machines as a percentage of the output at A.
PArelative price of grain and machines in the United States.
PR =relativeprice of grain and machines in prevailing rules.
AR =relativeprice of grain and machines in adjusted rubles.
of
NOTE: In Figure 2a, indifference curves are homothetic. In Figure 2b, production
possibility curves are homothetic. In Figure 2c, both sets of curves are homothetic
and L > P at prevailing rubles, P > L at adjusted rubles.
are equally well off or that the American indifference curves are scaled
up or down so that the American curve containing the point A
coincides with the Russian curve containing the point R. The demand
curve for grain in the bottom half of the figure is the locus of the
relative quantity of grain and the relative price of grain as traced out
along any indifference curve. Similarly, the height of each supply curve
is the derivative of the corresponding production possibility curve.
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acommon demand curve; price and quantity are negatively correlated
and
TPA <P < TwR =TIVA<L < TPR
The true welfare indexes are equal and are bounded by P and L, but
the indexes of production potential lie outside these limits.
In the technology case, the production possibility curves are homo-
thetic, and the indifference curves are not. One of the production
possibility curves is scaled up so that the two production possibility
curves coincide. Indifference curves differ because tastes differ or as
a consequence of income effects. Here the demand curves shift between
A and R and the supply curve is constant; consequently,
TWA <L < TPR =TPA<P < TWA
In this case, the true productivity indexes are bracketed by P and L,
but the welfare indexes lie outside these limits.
In the tax case, production possibility curves and indifference curves
are both homothetic, and American and Russian relative prices differ
because the countries have different systems of taxation. For con-
venience, suppose that the American tax structure is ideal and that the
Russian tax structure is not. A Russian excise tax on grain creates a
spread between the demand price of grain (the slope of the indifference
curve at R) and the supply price of grain (the slope of the production
possibility curve at R). The demand price is what Bergson calls price
in prevailing rubles, and the supply price is what Bergson calls price
in adjusted rubles. As there are two prices at R, a movement from A
to R may be thought of as being along a demand curve when prices
are in prevailing rubles or along a supply curve when prices are in
adjusted rubles. Consequently, P < TWR =T1.vA<L when prices are
measured in prevailing rubles, and, L < TPA =TpR when
prices are measured in adjusted rubles. This is a statistician's ideal,
with two sets of Paasche and Laspeyres indexes, one set bounding true
welfare indexes and the other set bounding true production indexes.
Bergson's data look more like the taste case than the technology
case because the Laspeyres index is greater than the Paasche index
even at adjusted rubles.2 There is a tendency toward the tax case, for
2Theseresults are consistent with a large body of evidence that the structure of
taste is more stable than the structure of technology in international comparisons216 Current International Comparisons
the Paasche index, while always less than the Laspeyres index, is some-
what greater at adjusted rubles than at prevailing rubles—23.2 per cent
as against 22.1 per cent in Bergson's Table 2.
The influence of taxes may be greater than these data suggest. First,
it is almost impossible to account for all sources of divergence between
demand prices and supply prices in both countries. Bergson's conver-
sion of prevailing rubles into adjusted rubles accounts for some sources
in Russia and none at all in the United States. A full and complete
conversion of prices to adjusted rubles and adjusted dollars might
substantially reduce the spread between the Laspeyres and Paasche
indexes. Second, the spread between the two indexes might have been
widened by the way services were evaluated. It is my impression that
for some items such as education and defense, where direct measures
of output are hard to come by, Bergson assumed that the marginal
products of Russian and American workers were the same. I cannot
very well criticize Bergson for doing so because I have made the same
assumption in less justifiable circumstances, and because he frequently
had no alternative. Nevertheless, this assumption may overstate Russian
output. The Russians, who appear to be less efficient than the Ameri-
cans in making goods, may also be less efficient in rendering services.
If so, quantities are overstated and prices are understated accordingly
because prices are imputed by dividing quantity into value. This may
account for some of the very low Russian prices in Bergson's Table 13,
especially wages in public administration and defense.
REPLY iwBERGSON
I can comment on only a few of the many interesting questions that
the discussants of my paper raise. To refer first to Dan Usher: Hicks
and Samuelson showed long ago how index numbers of real national
and in comparisons over time. In studies of economic growth, this is called the
Gerschentron effect. See E. Ames and J. Carison, "Production Index Bias as a
Measure of Economic Development," Oxford Economic Papers, March 1968; P.
Jonas and H. Sardy, "The Gerschentron Effect: A Re-examination, Review of
Economics and Statistics, February 1970; and Y. Toda, "On International Com-
parison of Consumption: Studies in Index Number Theory and Measurement," Ph.D.
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incomemight serve as observations on changes in production capacity,
as represented by the production possibility schedule. Essentially, if
such schedules are, as usually assumed, concave from below, one may
infer from that the basket of goods produced in 2
is beyond the capacity of 1. Hence, production possibilities in 2 are
greater than in 1 in the vicinity of the observed point in 2. Similarly,
if the basket of goods produced in 1is beyond the
capacity of 2, and production possibilities in 1 are greater than in 2
in the vicinity of the observed point in 1.
Note that, as so often in index number theory, inferences are only
of an ordinal sort. Production capacity is said to be greater in one
situation than in another, and that isall. Moreover, as Hicks and
Samuelson made clear, even these inferences, strictly speaking, presup-
pose valuations of an ideal kind: Relative prices correspond to mar-
ginal rates of transformation. In the article that I cited, however,
Moorsteen showed that with such valuations real national income
data may also be construed as representing comparative magnitudes
of production capacity. Thus, data in the prices of 2 measure the ratio
of capacities to produce l's composite, and data in the prices of 1
measure the ratio of capacities to produce 2's composite. The measures
are precisely accurate if production possibility schedules are linear.
Otherwise, they are more or less approximate, depending on the degree
of concavity or convexity of the schedules.
In my essay, I refer also to a previous study of mine (Real SNIP),
which may have contributed further to this analysis- Thus, data in
prices of either 1 or 2 are observations on relative capacities to produce
either mix. Under certain conditions, however, data in prices of 1 are,
as Moorsteen assumed, more accurate than data in prices of 2 as
observations on relative capacities to produce 2's composite. Similarly,
data in prices of 2 are more accurate than data in prices of 1 as obser-
vations on relative capacities to produce 1. The conditions are:(i)
Production possibility schedules are, as with Hicks and Samuelson,
concave from below, or at least not very convex; and (ii) the Gerschen-
kron effect holds, that is, data in prices of 2 are more favorable to 1
than data in prices of 1, and conversely.
To all this, Professor Usher has now added a further proposition.
To conform with his notation, let us designate by T1 and T2 the true218 CurrentInternational Comparisons
measures of changes in production capacity in respect of l's composite,
on the one hand, and 2's composite, on the other. Also, L is the index
of real national income measured in l's prices, and P is the index of
real national income in 2's prices. Then, if L > P and production
possibility schedules are concave from below,
(1) T1<P<L<T2
In effect, the two true measures fall outside the two index numbers. If
P> L, the two index numbers may bracket the two true measures,
but, as I indicated, the case where L > P is the one favorable to Moor-
steen's argument. And, to come to my essay, with the United States as
1 and the USSR as 2, L > P in my calculations. Usher therefore prop-
erly stresses that case. What, however, follows?
Usher apparently considers(1) as practically fatal to calculations
such as I present, at least where the concern is to measure production
capacity. Rather than bracketing the true measures, the usual index
numbers leave them unrestricted. Differences in production capacity,
therefore, remain quite indeterminate. That surely is too pessimistic
a conclusion. After all, if L > F, we may still infer that L < T2 and
T1 <P whenever production possibility schedules are concave from
below. Those would seem to be interesting implications.
More important, Usher apparently sees index numbers of real na-
tional income as serving only to delimit the true measure of produc-
tion capacity. Moorsteen, to repeat, showed that such index numbers
may also be viewed as approximations to true measures. That is not at
all the same thing. At least, an index number may be an upper or
lower bound for a true measure, and yet be considered a poor
approximation to it. Alternatively, we may be uncertain whether a
true measure lies above or below an index number, and still feel it to
be closely approximated by that number. The degree of approximation
of an index number to a true measure does indeed depend on the curva-
ture of the production possibility schedules. That is not known with
any certainty, but it is open to inquiry, and meantime it does seem
illuminating to view index numbers, as Moorsteen does, as not only
delimiting but approximating relative production capacity.
Indeed, should we view them, as Usher does, only in the former way,
the situation would be if anything worse than what he portrays. EvenUSSR and U.S. Comparative National Income219
ifP> L, as he is aware, the two index numbers may still not bracket
the true measures. If production possibility schedules are concave from
below, it may be inferred as before that L < T2 and T1 <P, but we
may or may not have 7'2<Pand T1 > L. And purely a priori, we
cannot be sure that schedules are concave to begin with.
To repeat, however, L > P in my essay. That is also a usual case, for
the Gerschenkron effect has been encountered again and again in real
national income calculations. Implications of the data for production
capacity when L > P, therefore, are of particular interest.
While Usher refers to Moorsteen's article, he does not consider my
elaboration of it in Real SNIP. It may be worth noting, therefore,
that for the case where L> P and production possibility schedules are
concave, (1)isalready more or less implied in my analysis there. Usher,
however, has made the matter explicit. That is to the good, but the
consequences do not seem nearly as serious as he supposes.
I have followed Usher thus far in assuming that, as with Hicks and
Samuelson, prices are such as to yield ideal valuations. In the real
world, that is hardly so, and the ruble prices of the USSR are no
exception to that rule. In my essay, I try to deal with the resultant
problem by translating into "adjusted rubles" index numbers compiled
initially in terms of prevailing ruble prices. The adjusted ruble
standard is an expedient whose rationale and limitations I have dis-
cussed at length in previous studies. I am no more able here than I was
in my essay to explore that theme again.
It should be observed, though, that Moorsteen's interpretation of real
national income may, if anything, gain in interest relative to Usher's
because of the divergencies of ruble prices from scarcity value. By all
accounts, these divergencies go hand in hand in the USSR with a
marked shortfall from production possibilities. That is as might be
expected, and one need not ponder long to be aware also that in such
circumstances real national income data can serve at best as observa-
tions, not on production possibilities, but on some kind of "feasibility
locus" reflecting the prevailing inefficiency. The nature of that locus
and the manner in which it may be observed are among the matters
that I have sought to explore elsewhere.1 For fairly obvious reasons,
1Seeespecially, Bergson, Productivity.220 CurrentInternational Comparisons
though, uncertainties about whether oneS or another true measure lies
above or below one or another index number seem only to be com-
pounded in this case. It is reassuring, therefore, that national income
data even so may be at least broadly indicative of production capacity
as represented by the feasibility locus.
Prevailing dollar prices also have their limitations. These did not
seem serious enough to warrant the sort of revaluation made for data
in prevailing ruble prices. There probably is the more reason at this
point, however, to stress the Moorsteen interpretation of real national
income data compared with Usher's.
If national income data are so difficult to cOnstrue theoretically,
why trouble to apply the theoretic analysis at all? At the risk of under-
lining the obvious, perhaps I should explain that, esoteric as the theory
is, it still seems to facilitate organization of the inquiry and interpreta-
tion of the results. Not to be underestimated either, I think is the value
of the discipline imposed on practitioners in limiting subjective judg-
ments in an area where opportunities for such judgments are prover-
bially large; and at the same time in helping assure a desirable
uniformity in conventions in different investigations. All this presup-
poses, however, an understanding that production capacity is apt to be
elusive empirically, and that what can be achieved at most is not a
precise and definitive measurement, but a contribution to informed
appraisal. Usher apparently would have us seek only the ideal. It
would be a sad day for economics if such a counsel of perfection were
ever widely heeded.
Usher explores theoretically the use of real national income data to
measure not only production capacity but welfare. In my essay I
focused exclusively on production capacity, and so will not try to react
to Usher's discussion of welfare. Perhaps I should explain, however,
that I stressed production capacity chiefly because difficulties in com-
piling appropriate data for that application only seem compounded
where the concern is with welfare and where, accordingly, relative
prices are supposed to correspond to marginal rates of substitution.
Most importantly, such a desideratum is especially difficult to approach
in the USSR in the comparative valuation of consumers' and capital
goods. That is so whether welfare is envisaged (as it usually is) in termsUSSR and U.S. Comparative National Income221
ofconsumers' preferences, or (as is often suggested it should be) in
terms of planners' preferences. The reasons for the difficulty are of a
familiar kind, and need not be labored.
In replying to the discussants of his own essay, Afriat too has in-
quired further into the pure theory of production capacity measure-
ment. While the inquiry, apparently was stimulated by the exchange
between Usher and me, I must leave comment on it to another occa-
sion. Afriat, however, ascribes to me an aversion to exact concepts. If
he had troubled. to acquaint himself with my previous efforts, in writ-
ings cited in my essay, to formulate an appropriate conceptual frame-
work for production capacity measurements, I doubt that he could
have labored under such a misapprehension. Perhaps my reply to
Usher will also indicate how far Afriat is from the mark. In properly
seeking theoretic rigor, however, we must be careful not to succumb
to a stultifying empirical perfectionism. With all their limitations,
national income data have something interesting to tell us about pro-
duction capacity, if we will only listen.
There is little basis to try either to add to or subtract from Green-
slade's interesting comments. He seems to assume, though, that in com-
piling price data for the USSR we are limited to quotations which the
Soviet government sees fit to release. In fact, the sample of commodities
for which comparative ruble and dollar price quotations can be
assembled leaves much to be desired, but at least for consumers' goods
it is compiled not only from Soviet official releases but to a considerable
extent from foreign observers' reports.
Greenslade is certainly right that 'Soviet planning has tended to
sacrifice variety for volume of output, and no doubt the sacrifice has
often been inordinate. For many goods, even the reduced costs realized
under the protracted serial production that the limitation on variety
made possible must have exceeded their worth to users. That must have
been so for producers' as well as consumers' goods. Since the goods in
question are apt to be produced in relatively large quantities in the
USSR, I agree that there may be further cause here of overstatement
of Soviet output relative to the United States where the concern is to
appraise welfare. Where the concern is to measure production capacity,222 Currentinternational Comparisons
it is not easy to see why the inordinate stress on volume should cause
bias one way or the other.2
Theoretic treatments of production capacity measurement usually
abstract from international trade. As Greenslade points out, however,
such trade affords the opportunity to any country to carry out com-
modity transformations that may be costly to realize through domestic
resource transfers. Indeed, given trade, transformations are always pos-
sible along a linear schedule, at least if the country in question does
not trade on so large a scale as to affect world prices. With trans-
formations along a linear schedule, however, circumstances are ideally
favorable for interpretation of national income data in the Moorsteen
manner. One is tempted to see in trade, therefore, a way of circum-
venting difficulties of production capacity measurement such as have
been discussed. What is then measured, though, is in effect "purchasing
power" in world markets. That is of interest, but for clarity it should
be considered that it is not the same thing as production capacity, as
usually understood, and that too is of interest.3
Greenslade is troubled by the problem posed for the compilation
and interpretation of comparative national income data for the USSR
and the United States by the pervasive replacement in the former
country of market processes by centralist planning and by the asso-
ciated inefficiency. I am too; but, as indicated, I have tried to deal with
these issues elsewhere and cannot reopen them in any serious way here.
On such a problematic question as the comparative national income
of the USSR and the United States, I am naturally gratified to learn
of the close agreement between my results and those of the ECE study
2 Even for welfare appraisal, only the calculations in rubles should be affected,
and, for obvious reasons, a bias there seems, if anything, more likely in the calcula-
tions in adjusted rubles, which correspond to Soviet factor cost, than in those in pre-
vailing rubles, which often diverge from such costs in the direction of user values.
Note that so far as quantity has been stressed inordinately over quality in the
case of producers' goods, Soviet output currently must be below the level that could
have been achieved if previously the mix of producers' goods had been a more
economical one. Greenslade rightly points out, though, that this does not bear at
all on the question of whether current Soviet output, as calculated, is overstated
or not.
3 Note also that the linear "purchasing power frontier"has a slope corresponding
to world prices, and that among the vectors culminating on the frontier the one
corresponding to actual output represents not total output, but the output of
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towhich Kenessey refers. In his thoughtful discussion, Kenessey also
compares my results with data published by the Soviet Central Statis-
tical Administration (TSU). The comparison is made difficult by the
differences in methodology, especially the exclusion of diverse final
services from the TSU data for "net material product," and their
inclusion in my figures on the gross national product. Does not the use
of the Soviet national income concept and the resultant exclusion of
services tend to favor the USSR in a comparison with the United
States?
That is certainly a plausible theory, and, while Kenessey himself
expressly disavows it, I am grateful to him for referring to it, for there
is thus an opportunity for me to underline an interesting aspect of my
calculations: Paradoxically, the facts on the comparative volume of
services in the USSR and the United States are otherwise than is sug-
gested.
The final services omitted from net material product are broadly of
/
thesort that I refer to in my essay as "selected final services." As ap-
pears from my Table 1, Soviet GNP suffers rather than benefits, rela-
tive to that of the United States, when such services are omitted. That
is the result whether the valuation is in rubles or in dollars, but espe-
cially in the latter case. What is the explanation? Among the services
in question are defense pay and subsistence. Perhaps chiefly on that
account, the volume of services relative to goods in the USSR is larger
than might be supposed in comparison with the corresponding relation
in the United States (see my Table 13). Moreover, as indicated in my
essay, the parities used to translate service outlays from rubles 'to dol-
lars and from dollars to rubles are highly favorable to theruble>\
The comparison between my data and those of TSU must be read
in that light. As Kenessey points out, my results are nominally close
to those of TSU. On the indicated theory, therefore, one would have
to conclude that, allowing for the difference in concepts, either I am
somewhat overstating or the TSU is somewhat understating Soviet
national income relative to that of the United States. In fact, so far
as there is nominal agreement between TSU and me, the implication
is, I think, the reverse: Allowing for the difference in concepts, either
I am somewhat understating or TSU is somewhat overstating Soviet
national income relative to that of the United States.224 CurrentInternational Comparisons
In comparing the two calculations, however, it should be considered
that they differ in other respects besides the treatment of services. As
implied, I refer to output gross and TSU to output net of depreciation.
Very likely there are other methodological divergencies as well. Only
meager information is available on the TSU calculation, but, if we
may judge at all from the calculations of the Soviet economist A. I. Kats
(see my Table 8 and related portions of my essay), my measures prob-
ably also differ from Soviet measures such as those of TSU in basic
data and more specific procedures.
Kenessey urges the possible value of cooperation between Soviet and
U.S. economists as a means of improvingon calculations such as mine.
Anyone seriously interested in the advance of real knowledge con-
cerning the two economies can only endorse his suggestion. Let us hope
that the time is not far off when it can be implemented.